Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
10/21/2024 9:37 AM

STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF OTTER TAIL SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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Craig Stevenson, Marie Stevenson,

Plaintiffs, File No. 56-CV-20-2928

vs. Transcript of Proceedings

Sean Stevenson, Renee Stevenson,
Lisa Stevenson-Allen, Ashley Anderson,

Defendants.

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MOTION

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The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Kevin M. Miller, Judge of District Court, at the Otter Tail County Courthouse, via Zoom technology, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, on September 16, 2024.

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APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiffs:	Matthew Schaap 14985 Glazier Ave, Suite 525 Apple Valley, MN 55124
For the Defendants: Lisa Stevenson-Allen, Ashley Anderson	Ross Tentinger 14665 Galaxie Ave, Suite 140 Apple Valley, MN 55124
For the Defendants: Renee Stevenson, Sean Stevenson	Kirsten Hansen France Place 3601 Minnesota Dr, Suite 450 Minneapolis, MN 55435

Dana Eifert
Official Court Reporter

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(Proceedings commenced.)

THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everyone. At this time, the Court will call Craig Stevenson, Marie Stevenson versus Sean Stevenson, et al; file 56-CV-20-2928.

I have Mr. Schaap on behalf of the plaintiffs. I have Mr. Tentinger here on behalf of, let's see, Ms. Stevenson-Allen and Ashley Anderson. I have Ms. Hansen here on behalf of Sean and Renee Stevenson. And is it Mr. Couillard?

MR. COUILLARD: Yes, Your Honor. Stephen Couillard.

THE COURT: And are you with Ms. Hansen?

MR. COUILLARD: I am.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COUILLARD: I don't -- I don't anticipate speaking.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you for that.

All right. And we have two motions before the court. The first motion we're going to address is the motion for the stay of execution of judgment. I'll just tell everybody we have about 30 minutes, so please keep your arguments concise. I have reviewed the filings prior to the hearing here today.

Mr. Schaap.

MR. SCHAAP: Thank you, Your Honor. So this is a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment. At this stage, it doesn't look like there's any disagreement among the parties about whether the stay is appropriate. It looks like the disagreement is to the amount and form of security.

The rules that apply don't allow for security to be in the form of cash held by the party that's seeking the security, which, in this case, would be the defendants. I -- there's no citation to the law, no precedent for that. We've offered a letter of credit which is similar to a bond. But costs a little bit less. It's in the name of a bank. The bank pays it like a check. The bank is the -- is the one that pays it. The plaintiffs do not. So they don't have authority or control.

As to the amount, the amount should not be in controversy at this stage. We've offered and have a letter for $70,000. The award in this case was $60,000 and change. We've added to that a significant amount of interest. More significant than even an appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court would justify under the circumstances. We -- if, if, if the Court looks at when the judgment was entered in this case May 17, 2024, date of entry or judgment, that's when interest started to

accrue or starts to accrue. It couldn't have been accruing during the period when the judgment was non-appealable. That would be inequitable and it's inconsistent with Minnesota law, specifically the *Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete* case we cited in our reply. So as to the amount, the amount is more than sufficient and we asked the Court to grant the motion, approve the amount of $70,000, and the letter of credit I believe is on file with the Court.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Tentinger.

(Brief pause in the proceedings.)

MR. TENTINGER: I was muted. I apologize, Your Honor.

Plain-- or excuse me, Plaintiffs' reading of the Rule 108.02 is incorrect. This Court has broad authority to stay the judgment and how to choose the form of security. The case cited by plaintiffs in their argument or in their reply, *DRJ v. City of St. Paul,* does not hold what they're saying it does. That Court of Appeals expressly states that the court -- this Court has broad authority to establish the form of the security. We are asking and I'll be clear Your Honor, we are asking either the money be paid into the Court or paid to Tentinger Law Firm. And the only reason that the payment to Tentinger Law Firm is even in consideration is, this is because

that's exactly how plaintiffs initially made their proposed stipulation to us to resolve this issue. But they did not include any interest whatsoever. So clearly, the defendants were not agreeable to doing so. However, they already presented it once. There's no reason why that's not a valid form of security at this time, or alternatively, paying it into the courts, so there's security there.

Craig Stevenson has a long history of doing whatever he can to avoid making payments on behalf of Sean and Renee. It goes all the way back to the divorce and the contempt proceedings where he wasn't paying child support. I think this is evidence that their intention not to honor this is clear by the fact that by their own calculation, this appeals process is going to take through October 24th, 2025, but their letter of credit expires a few months before then. So even if the appeal process goes the way that they believe it will, the letter of credit still is not going to be valid. I don't think this is an oversight. This is from plaintiffs who have looked up where Your Honor lives and how many hearings you've addressed during certain periods of times. To claim now that it was an error in when the letter of credit expires, I think is disingenuous. For all these reasons, we believe the most secure way to

enforce this judgment through a stay would be a payment either through -- to this firm, to be held in trust, or alternatively, paid to this Court.

As far as the amount, based on my calculation that's in our memorandum, we believe that the amount needs to be set at $76,000. That accounts for interest all the way from October 13th, 2023. I know that issue is up on appeal right now, but if it is affirmed then the interest goes back that date, and if it isn't -- if it's overturned well, then certainly then the defendants wouldn't be entitled to that interest, but it at least needs to be accounted for in this security. And for that reason, we believe that a payment to this Court or to Tentinger Law Firm of $76,000 is required. Or alternatively, if the letter of credit is sufficient, if the Court wants to go with that, it at least has to extend through the full process of appeals. It is simply not going to be sufficient if it expires mid-appeal process. I have nothing further, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hansen

MS. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I actually have nothing to add to what Mr. Tentinger said. I believe it sums up nicely what our opinions are.

THE COURT: All right, then we'll move to the plaintiffs' other motion which is to disqualify and

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vacate. So, Mr. Schaap.

MR. SCHAAP: Thank you, Your Honor. And before we move on, I'm not sure if I understand the expiration argument that was just made.

THE COURT: Oh, -- I'm, yeah. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I should have given you the opportunity to respond there. So go ahead, Mr. Schaap.

MR. SCHAAP: I don't understand the expiration argument and the Court should and is empowered to order security in a form acceptable to the Court in the form of security. And the suggestion that there's some kind of game being played with, with regard to the expiration date the Court can simply order a replacement letter of credit, if, if there's some kind of technical argument they want to raise.

I would note too that the Court has sanctioned parties in this case and that our clients have promptly paid those sanctions. And so to the extent there's some kind of historical claim that the Stevensons don't pay their debts, that's absurd. They have operated a -- operated a successful business and were well known for properly paying and paying in full, on time, every time. So that's just a silly argument to go back and suggest there's any kind of risk in that regard.

Moving on to the motion for recusal and vacatur.

MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH

Your Honor, I was a law clerk in the Seventh District. The thing I found most remarkable about the job straight out of law school was the amount of power I had, and maybe powers not the right word, but it was a really stark contrast going from a student to going into chambers with lawyers and a judge. Helping the judge make decisions. Helping the judge write jury instructions on very important matters for the litigants. I found it remarkable to do that job for two years. I developed a very close relationship with my judge. She attended my wedding with her husband. I also clerked for her husband on a conflict case in Mille Lacs County. I developed a close relationship with my judge in just two years. So this motion is a little bit different from my perspective. I've also interviewed law clerks over the years for jobs at our law firm. And many of the law clerks I've talked to have had similar experiences. It's a very meaningful experience to be a law clerk, to be behind the scenes and see how judicial decision-making works. And so I bring that to the Court's attention knowing full well the Court is aware of how this system is set up.

This Court doesn't have time, a sufficient amount of time, to do the amount of work that the Court has to do, and law clerks play a critical role in that process of

drafting and research. When I was in high school, I mentored with what was essentially a law clerk, but in California, they're called them research attorneys. And I think the term clerk has the sort of administrative sound to it when in reality what they're doing is the job of a lawyer and it's important work that they do.

And so to -- turning to this case, when it was discovered that Mr. Morrison had apparently written or participated in writing numerous decisions that were pretty critical in this case to our clients, and that, Mr. Morrison, the law clerk, had previously clerked for Ms. Hansen's father, Judge Hansen, this raised some questions and, and, initially it raised just the minimal amount of scrutiny. Maybe some theories and some questions. But as we dug into it further and as the metadata on these orders reflected that more and more of them had been written by or assisted in Mr. Morrison. And as we looked at Mr. Morrison's background and understanding that he was not just a one or two-year law clerk like I was, moving on at some point to become a lawyer, but he was more of a career law clerk that I don't believe is licensed to practice in Minnesota, which doesn't matter, but it, it would suggest that he doesn't have aspirations to become an attorney at a law firm in the state of Minnesota and is comfortable being a clerk

long term. That's an asset to the court because that institutional knowledge and the history that he brings to the, to the, to the Otter Tail County Courthouse is increasingly valuable every year. So as a clerk goes from five years to ten years, they have a lot more information about the system and just the practice of law in the context of judicial decision-making. And so it's, it's not illogical that he would have been brought into a complex case like this. But at the time that he was brought in to provide assistance, there was no disclosure of the connection between Ms. Hansen and Mr. Morrison being the former law clerk for Ms. Hansen's father, Judge Hansen.

And so under those circumstances, as we've articulated under the *Powell* decision and I don't want to take for granted either, Your Honor, that Mr. Morrison's -- we haven't, we haven't conducted discovery in this, into these issues. We have not been privy to any behind-the-scenes information that's not public. But what we can see is, there are multiple letters from Mr. Morrison to litigants indicating that he is Judge Hansen's law clerk. He identifies himself as a law clerk, as Judge Hansen's law clerk in multiple cases throughout the 2000s, and so that was part of what we, what we, based this, this motion on. Because essentially, it's a motion

based on the appearance of impropriety or the appearance of bias, and what we looked at is what we had access to. We had access to the *Estate of Jeremiah Fiedler* case. The *Linda Marie Blondeau* case. *The United Community Bank versus Daniel Miller* case. The *Chris Helle versus Stenerson Lumbar DBA Exteriors Unlimited* case. And I could go on with more and more cases where, where Mr. Morrison identified himself as Judge Hansen's law clerk.

By having established that connection, the, the really key part of this and I want to address some of the arguments that have been made, understanding we only have half an hour, so I'm not going to take Mr. Tentinger's time here, but the critical piece of this we believe is that -- and the unfortunate reality is -- that this should have been disclosed. It should have been brought to the attention of the litigants, the plaintiffs in this case, and it wasn't.

Under the *Powell* decision you see, *Powell* is a very -- Judge Amundson's wrongdoing was well known in the state of Minnesota. It made headlines, obviously, it was a big deal. And in the *Powell* case, you know, Rich Ostlund -- and I have cases with him right now, we're on the same side, fortunately, -- but Rich was on one side of that case representing Ms. Powell. And

Eric Magnuson, Diane Bratvold, both of whom later became judges with the, with -- who I've also worked with on appeals -- they were on the other side of this for Rider Bennett which is no longer in existence. But in that case, you saw all of the arguments that were made to the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the court sort of had to deal with them how they had to deal. It was sort of with reluctance that they one by one went through these arguments that were made by Rider Bennett at the time. And basically said, you know, there's really no way we can get around this. There's an appearance of impropriety. Judge Powell served on the three-judge panel on the Court of Appeals that affirmed this decision. And it went against Ms. Powell, and it went kind of in favor of, of the attorneys at Rider Bennett, who had essentially been Judge Amundson's lawyers through a trust. And they said, you know, we, we might not like it, but we've got to do it in order to protect the judicial integrity of our system. The appearance that, that, people are going to take away from this if they see that a judge on a three-judge panel is making a decision that favors the law firm that represents him or has represented him. And there the lawyers didn't even, didn't even, work together. The trust lawyers were not the same appellate lawyers, but the Court said that

didn't matter. Once that connection was established, the appearance of impropriety required vacatur of that Court of Appeals decision.

And what's important to recognize, in this case, and in that one, is that the Court of Appeals initially refused to vacate its own decision, saying that Judge Amundson was one of three unanimous votes to affirm, and there even that in the Minnesota Supreme -- and subsequently the Minnesota Supreme Court had denied review. So it would appear that all of the law, the case arguments, that have been made by the defendants are summed up in *Amundson* and in *Sigurdson*. But the issue of vacatur and recusal was not addressed. It was not dealt with. And so the law of the case wasn't even discussed. It was, it, it was an argument that was so far off base that that nobody made that argument. And that argument is equally inapplicable in this setting.

But the important piece to take away, Your Honor, is that when the Minnesota Supreme Court fully analyzed *Powell*, they looked at the decision of the, of the Court of Appeals and said, the Court of Appeals was wrong because even if Amundson was one of three votes and all of those were unanimous, we still must protect the integrity and the appearance of integrity in the system of judicial decision making and cannot allow

Judge Amundson presence on that panel to be viewed by the public as impugning the integrity of the judicial system. And so they vacated. And that is the, the, remedy and the appropriate form of relief.

As you look at these cases, the *Shell Oil* case, I mean the Federal Circuit is not applicable here. They, they, -- I've, I've appeared before them in Washington, DC, a couple of times, -- but that, that Federal Circuit deals with very complex issues like patents and trademarks. And what they said, in that case, is even where there's de novo review if the error is not harmless -- and it's not here -- the de novo review does not sanitize the underlying decision or give the public or the judge the opportunity or right to say, recusal is not needed because after all even if it goes up on appeal the review is de novo and a de novo review will fix any potential issue that was credited by the appearance of impropriety. And, here, the problem is the appearance of impropriety and we get through to the -- to the -- but all of the factors as we argued under the *Liljeberg* analysis as reflected in *Powell* are established. And as we've fully briefed those, I'm not going to reiterate and restate, but I wanted to just put a little bit more, more context around why the appearance of impropriety.

We have a reasonableness standard. We don't have a

different standard that applies whether someone would reasonably believe under these circumstances that there's a problem. I don't know how anybody could look at these circumstances and -- I understand that the defendants take a different position, I don't think their position has merit, but from a purely, we care about the system, we want the system to appear fair to the reasonable outside observer. These circumstances as, as we currently see them in the public record don't allow for that. They would cause a reasonable observer to believe that there's an appearance of bias or impropriety. And for that reason, recusals needed, and vacatur is as well.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schaap, is it your normal practice to put the location of the city of which a judicial officer resides?

MR. SCHAAP: What was that?

THE COURT: I said is it your usual practice in matters to put what city a judicial officer resides in?

MR. SCHAAP: No, it's not.

THE COURT: All right. And you agree it was here though?

MR. SCHAAP: What was here?

THE COURT: That the -- my -- the city of my residence was within your paperwork.

MR. SCHAAP: I believe so.

MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH

THE COURT: All right. And tell me how that is relevant to your motion here today.

MR. SCHAAP: It's -- much of what was provided is context. We didn't bring this -- we didn't bring this motion for actual bias. But as you can see from the filings, there is a, there is an argument made by the defendants and the defendants made this argument pretty extensively in their, in their, papers. That the decisions at issue all were essentially fair and reasonable and down the middle and that not all of the decisions that were authored by Mr. Morrison favored only the defense. Some of them favored the plaintiffs as well.

Under the circumstances, the context of where people reside or where people live is not, is not relevant, but it's, but it's it was provided as additional context for my client's declaration.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm, I'm still trying to figure out the, the context of how where the city I would reside in provides extra context and that's what I'm looking for, Mr. Schaap.

MR. SCHAAP: I don't have that, Your Honor. I can’t speak to my client’s decision in including that in his declaration. I did not draft the declaration.

THE COURT: Isn't it ultimately your decision to submit that declaration?

MR. SCHAAP: It is. I, I filed the declaration. I did not draft the declaration.

THE COURT: That's not my question. Ultimately, you determined it was appropriate to file that declaration in this matter.

MR. SCHAAP: As context for the overall motion, yes.

THE COURT: And that includes my city of residence?

MR. SCHAAP: I, I believe that record speaks for itself.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tentinger.

MR. TENTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try to be very brief.

I'll start with plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel's anecdotal inability to remain impartial is immaterial to the facts here. But to begin, defendant's position is quite simple. The test for disqualification is objective. The rule requires disqualification if a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The facts as alleged with respect to Clerk Morrison, excuse me, fail to satisfy that test. And despite the lengthy briefs and lengthy arguments here, plaintiffs have not identified a single case where the judge or law clerk was disqualified due to a former employer appearing before

them, let alone where the family member of a former employer appearing before the court mandated disqualification. Analogists to the present alleged facts are cases where a law clerk appears before a judge they formally clerk for. It is well established that such a past employment relationship does not disqualify the judge. If a former clerk can appear before the, excuse me, if a former clerk can appear before the prior judge without causing concerns about bias, the logic equally applies in reverse. A clerk is certainly capable of maintaining impartiality if the judge they once worked for appeared before them in the courtroom. Extending that logic to this case, we reach the rational conclusion that if a former law clerk can appear before their judge and maintain impartiality, then surely that situation here, -- the situation here is far less concerning. And here it's not even the former employer directly involved, it's the family member of that former employer. This significantly and fatally weakens any argument offered by plaintiff.

Clerk Morrison's impartiality could -- cannot reasonably be questioned. This conclusion is only strengthened by the fact that Ms. Hansen and Clerk Morrison have never spoken and to Ms. Hansen's -- Hansen's knowledge have never met. There is no personal

connection. There is no direct interaction and certainly no evidence of any bias resulting from their association.

It is clear that plaintiffs' argument is based on -- is not based on fact or relevant case law. When reviewing their principal memorandum compared to their reply, we can see how they introduced new facts at will, relying heavily on conjecture and presumption rather than the record. To overcome the fatal case law cited by defendants, plaintiffs have constructed an alternative narrative, now claiming that Clerk Morrison's connection to Judge Hansen terminated only 13 months before this lawsuit. However, their only support for this assertion is their own presumption.

Notably, one of the reasons plaintiffs require so many pages and take so much time during the hearing is that their arguments are built on speculation and conjecture. To reach their conclusions they need to draft up alternative holdings, alter the facts, and provide context that supports their speculation rather than rely on the actual record or any straightforward case summary.

Plaintiff's alternate reality is an exercise in fiction. To get a sense of just how frivolous their motion is we can examine their efforts to distort the case law to suit their narrative. For example, plaintiff

cite to *Vaska v. State* an Alaska Court of Appeals case from 1998. They attempt to argue that Clerk Morrison's role in this matter is analogist to the law clerk in *Vaska*, citing that Morrison was involved in drafting over a dozen orders. However, plaintiffs misrepresent the key facts of *Vaska*. The issue in *Vaska* was not simply that the clerk's involvement in drafting of bench memorandum. The real issue was that the clerk had improperly shared a confidential bench memorandum with a district attorney appearing in that case, going as far to include a note that essentially states, look how hard I'm working for the state. To equate a clerk drafting orders, in the normal course of judicial work, like Clerk Morrison did here, to blatant breach of confidentiality as in *Vaska* is an extreme distortion of fact. Plaintiff's argument is a weak effort to make an unfounded comparison where none exists.

In the end, the test for recusal is objective based on what a reasonable person knowing all the facts; would they question the court's impartiality? The test applied to these alleged facts results in the undeniable conclusion that disqualification is not mandated here or even warranted. Plaintiff's attempt to relitigate their claims must be denied, and for that, I will turn to my co-counsel, Ms. Hansen.

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THE COURT: Ms. Hansen.

MS. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I just have -- am going to try and keep as quiet as possible on this particular motion, but I do want to point out something for the Court's knowledge. Mr. Schaap tried to say that he hasn't had a chance to do discovery. He has in fact reached out to me asking for my father's social calendar and other things. So I am just here to say that I have and I will declare this before the Court, to my best knowledge, I have never met Clerk Morrison. If I have, I'm sorry. I don't remember him. And I believe, quite frankly, that this is an insult to the judicial integrity here. Under Mr. Schaap's theory, apparently, I can never appear in Otter Tail County because Clerk Morrison might somehow know me.

Again, that's a more visceral reaction, Your Honor. This is why I'm leaving it to Mr. Tentinger to respond more fully to this motion. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schaap.

Ope you're on mute, sorry.

MR. SCHAAP: Yeah, we have not had an opportunity to conduct discovery. I met and conferred with Mr. Tentinger and asked very specifically if Ms. Hansen would have any new information to provide about the relationship with Mr. Morrison at this hearing.

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If we were going to be surprised by something. He refused to provide any information. Essentially, said, you'll have to ask Ms. Hansen, so we did that in the letter, and in her response, she did not respond to most of the line-by-line inquiries in our letter. But we were simply trying to figure out what additional information might exist, that might impact this motion.

I did want to -- I, what I'm struck by is sort of the ships passing in the night that the plaintiffs and the defendants seem to be in this, in this case. They, they make these arguments sort of insulting our arguments, but then they don't use any citations to the record. And they don't cite any specifics. They come into these oral arguments essentially resting on what they've written. And without really explaining to the Court why they're entitled to the relief they're entitled to, and in the past that's been a fairly successful strategy for the defendants.

I wanted to comment, Your Honor, I was not able to locate the portion of the declaration that included any reference to your address while I was, while I was listening to Mr. Tentinger. But I believe that if I recall there was some connection to the amount of time that you must spend commuting and moving around. Which simply gets to the issue of how difficult it is to do

your job without significant assistance. Public records alone reflect thousands of hearings, which get, gets to your ability to, to get a lot done in a, in a short period of time. But it also maybe speaks to a problem with our system in that a case like this requires so significant and such significant resources just to to sift through the amount of information and data that exists, that it can be difficult for a judge to, to do that work, and that's where a law clerk, and in this case, Mr. Morrison potentially fills that gap and plays a really extensive role in the judicial decision-making process. We didn't have any improper intent in providing that additional context or analysis. But I believe that was the -- that was why it was provided.

THE COURT: All right. And I'll just note, it's in the -- your filing -- your client's declaration of July 26, 2024, paragraph 297. It doesn't give my specific address, but it does say where my residence is located in and which city. So.

MR. SCHAAP: And I, I, apologize if the Court believes that's of concern. My apologies to the Court.

THE COURT: I think, I think, obviously, that's why I'm bringing it up because I do believe it is a fairly significant concern given judicial safety and some of those, that I -- but it's there and it's what it is.

So, Mr. Tentinger, any response?

MR. TENTINGER: I would only rest on the fact that if plaintiff's argument relies on calculating how much time you spend in commute each day, it shows the frivolous arguments.

THE COURT: All right. So the Court is going to --

MR. SCHAAP: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Mr. Schaap?

MR. SCHAAP: -- If you have concerns about the public nature of that page, I -- we would certainly, I mean the Court is, (indiscernible), I would be open to sealing anything specific that the Court is concerned with in terms of locating or filing that document under seal.

THE COURT: And the court will take these matters under advisement.

I am going to do some additional context here because I believe it is necessary, as the -- was not noted in some of the forensic is that I'm guessing at least some of the initial orders would have been, and I used the term "authored" because apparently, that's the designation that Microsoft Word indicates as far as who creates the document, I think that's a better term than who authors them. But it would have been Ms. Kelly at

the beginning. Then there were several orders that would have been authored by Ms. Hovland, who left my employment to go to private practice in the late summer of '22, which is when I did request assistance because it was not an easy time to get a law clerk. So that is when I did request assistance. And just for the record, Mr. Morrison started with Judge Mark Hansen in November of 2013 and became Judge Sharon Benson's law clerk in September of 2016. Which I will note, is more than four years prior to the filing of the complaint in this matter, and it would have been six years after the filing of the complaint before Mr. Morrison had any other participation in this matter.

I do believe that those are important matters, and this Court does take the issue of recusal and that information seriously as the plaintiffs did dig in and found that I had recused myself from another file and I had referred to that individual as an acquaintance of my daughter. And I'm just going to note, I didn't fill out the whole thing to say that her and her twin sister were best friends with my daughter. That they would probably spend four days a week at our house growing up, and that I've attended weddings and everything else. So when folks kind of make the comments, well, he saw it there. It was fairly significant. I'm just noting that for the

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plaintiffs here, that I do take that seriously, so. I will take this under advisement and will issue an order in due course.

Thank you everyone.

MR. TENTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SCHAAP: Thank you.

(Proceedings concluded.)

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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN THE DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF OTTER TAIL SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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Craig Stevenson, Marie Stevenson,

Plaintiffs, File No. 56-CV-20-2928

vs. REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

Sean Stevenson, Renee Stevenson,

Lisa Stevenson-Allen, Ashley Anderson

- -

I, Dana Eifert, hereby certify that I am an official court reporter in the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Minnesota; that as such reporter I digitally recorded the proceedings in the above-entitled action; that I thereafter transcribed to typewriting the foregoing transcript from the digital recordings taken in Otter Tail County, Minnesota on September 16, 2024; and that the foregoing transcript consisting of twenty-six (26) pages, constitutes a full, true, and accurate transcription of said proceeding.

Dated: October 19, 2024

/s/ Dana Eifert

Dana Eifert
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