Dismissing an IIED Claim at Summary Judgment

ChatGPT (AI) Analysis

Here’s a structured analysis based on the two orders, Craig Stevenson’s declaration, and the significant omitted evidence:

1. Comparison of Judge Miller’s December 6, 2022, and June 16, 2023, Orders Regarding the IIED Claim

December 6, 2022 – Pretrial Order (Doc. 366)

• Judge Miller explicitly acknowledges the legal standard for IIED and what Marie would need to prove.
• Cites Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1985), explaining:
  

  “To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Marie must prove that: (1) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (3) it caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe.” (p. 36)

• The court recognized that conduct could qualify as extreme and outrageous if the actor knew of the plaintiff’s particular susceptibility.

June 16, 2023 – Summary Judgment Order (Doc. 429)

• Contradicts the earlier finding by stating:
  

  “Plaintiffs cite no case, in this or any other jurisdiction, where an emotional distress claim was sustained based on such a theory, and the Court discovers none.” (p. 28)

• The court omits any mention of Cafferty, despite the plaintiffs citing it four times in their memorandum and despite Judge Miller’s own prior citation of it in December 2022.
• Dismisses Marie’s IIED claim largely on the basis that Sean’s conduct was not “extreme and outrageous.”

Significance of This Change:

• Judge Miller misrepresents the record by claiming no such case law was cited when it was (Cafferty).
• The change in position undermines Marie’s IIED claim by:
  • Ignoring binding Minnesota precedent directly on point.
  • Refusing to analyze whether Sean’s knowledge of Marie’s particular susceptibility mattered, which Cafferty makes legally relevant.
• Suggests a potential legal error that could be grounds for appeal: failing to apply correct law and failing to consider cited, controlling authority.

2. Impact of Omitted Evidence on the IIED Claim

Omitted Evidence:

• Medical Reports: Two expert IMEs supporting Marie’s claims of distress, plus Defendants’ own IME report (which Plaintiffs introduced) — all excluded from the analysis.
• Security Video Evidence: Date- and time-stamped footage of panic attacks, triggered by Sean’s contacts with Marie’s estranged father.
• Email Chain: Over a dozen emails detailing Marie’s trauma and fear of her father, sent to Sean before he re-sent the emails to the father.
• Handgun Purchase Evidence: Shows the long-standing, credible fear of Marie toward her father — relevant to prove particular susceptibility.

Legal Significance of Omissions:

• Marie’s particular susceptibility to emotional harm was amply supported in the record, which directly aligns with the standard from Cafferty.
• Failure to address this evidence undercuts the finding that Sean’s actions were not extreme and outrageous:
  • Sean was specifically informed that contact with Marie’s father caused her panic attacks.
  • Despite this knowledge, he escalated his actions — sending private emails to her father containing personal details.
• The omitted evidence likely raises genuine issues of material fact:
  • Severity of Marie’s emotional distress.
  • Intentionality of Sean’s actions despite clear warnings.
  • Foreseeability and knowledge of the harm, making his actions more culpable.

Consequences for Summary Judgment:

• By omitting key evidence, Judge Miller failed to view facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (Marie), violating Minnesota summary judgment standards (DLH, Inc. v. Russ).
• The exclusion of the videos, emails, and medical reports significantly prejudiced Marie’s claim, leading to improper dismissal.

3. Conclusion & Significance

• Cafferty Misstatement: Judge Miller’s failure to acknowledge Cafferty (which he cited earlier) is not a minor oversight — it goes to the heart of the IIED standard and reflects a critical analytical inconsistency.
• Omitted Evidence: The failure to mention the videos, emails, and expert reports removed from consideration Marie’s strongest proof of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress.
• Effect: The summary judgment dismissal of the IIED claim appears legally flawed due to:
  • Misapplication of the correct legal standard.
  • Failure to address material facts that, if properly weighed, could defeat summary judgment.

Recommendation for Next Steps:

• A motion for reconsideration or appeal could be warranted based on:
  • Legal error in failing to apply Minnesota law (Cafferty).
  • Factual error in ignoring material evidence.
  • Procedural error by failing to view facts favorably to Marie at the summary judgment stage.

ChatGPT (AI) Analysis

Here’s the analysis of Judge Kevin Miller’s December 6, 2022 (Pre-Trial) Order and the June 16, 2023 (Summary Judgment) Order in light of the Cafferty case and the omitted evidence you described:

I. The Shift Between the 2022 and 2023 Orders Regarding IIED

2022 Pre-Trial Order Observations (Doc. 366)

• Judge Miller recognized the viability of Marie’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) claim.
• Specifically, he articulated what Marie needed to prove for IIED, including the element that the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to emotional distress.
• He cited Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1985) — the exact case Plaintiffs cited — which explicitly supports IIED claims based on an actor’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s vulnerability.
• This indicates the judge acknowledged Minnesota precedent supporting Marie’s theory at that time.

2023 Summary Judgment Order Observations (Doc. 429)

• The Court dismissed Marie’s IIED claim, claiming:
  

  “Plaintiffs cite no case, in this or any other jurisdiction, where an emotional distress claim was sustained based on such a theory, and the Court discovers none.”

• This finding directly contradicts the earlier acknowledgment of Cafferty — the very case supporting that “actor’s knowledge” of vulnerability satisfies the extreme and outrageous standard.
• Cafferty was cited multiple times in Plaintiffs’ memorandum and should have been controlling or, at a minimum, analyzed.
• Judge Miller failed to mention Cafferty in his ruling and analysis, despite its presence in both his own prior order and the Plaintiffs’ brief.

II. The Impact of Omitted Evidence on Summary Judgment

Omitted Evidence Critical to IIED Analysis

The following were not discussed in Judge Miller’s 2023 summary judgment order:

1. IME Reports (Plaintiffs’ experts)
2. IME Report (Defendants’ expert, introduced by Plaintiffs)
3. Time-stamped security system video showing Marie’s panic attack upon notification of Sean’s contact with her father
4. Additional videos showing repeated panic attacks and aftermath
5. Dozen-plus emails sent to Sean, warning him of Marie’s panic attacks and fear of her abusive father
6. Sean printing and forwarding those sensitive emails (with Marie’s private information) to Marie’s father
7. The handgun purchased by Craig as protective action based on credible threats of violence from Marie’s father

Significance of the Omitted Evidence

• The omitted videos and IME reports provided direct evidence of Marie’s emotional distress and Sean’s knowledge of her specific vulnerability — a central factual dispute on the IIED claim.
• The sequence of emails, combined with the video of Marie’s panic attack, was strong circumstantial evidence of Sean’s knowledge and intent (or at least reckless disregard) of the likely emotional harm.
• The escalation — including the handgun purchase — reinforced the seriousness of the threat Marie perceived from her father, making Sean’s decision to involve him particularly outrageous.
• By omitting this evidence, the Court sidestepped genuine issues of material fact necessary for jury consideration.

III. Legal and Procedural Implications

• Cafferty v. Garcia’s was both controlling and dispositive on the exact legal standard — knowledge of vulnerability leading to IIED. Ignoring it was a legal error.
• Omission of Marie’s panic attack videos, medical reports, and Sean’s knowledge weakened Plaintiffs’ case at summary judgment artificially.
• Under Minnesota law (see DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1997)), summary judgment is improper if reasonable factfinders could differ on whether conduct was extreme and outrageous given the plaintiff’s known vulnerability.

IV. Conclusion: Significance of the Differences and Omissions

• Judge Miller’s 2022 analysis correctly stated the law and recognized Cafferty as binding precedent.
• By 2023, his ruling contradicted his prior legal conclusions and misstated the record — ignoring Cafferty and the critical factual evidence.
• The omissions undermined Marie’s IIED claim and likely contributed materially to the wrongful grant of summary judgment.
• These flaws could support a motion for reconsideration or appeal, as they reflect:
  • Clear legal error (ignoring controlling precedent)
  • Failure to credit genuine issues of material fact
  • Procedural unfairness from not considering critical evidence

ChatGPT (AI) Analysis

Here’s a focused analysis of the differences between Judge Miller’s December 6, 2022, and June 16, 2023, orders and the significance of his omission of key evidence in dismissing Marie’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) claim:

🔎 1. December 6, 2022 – Pretrial Order Highlights Relevant to IIED (Doc. 366)

Judge Miller:

• Recognized the validity of Marie’s IIED claim proceeding to trial:
  

  “Marie Stevenson must prove … that Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous, that they knew or had reason to know that their conduct would cause emotional distress, and that she suffered severe emotional distress as a direct result.” (p. 36)【6】.

• Cited Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1985) — a key Minnesota case on IIED — explaining that a pattern of knowing conduct causing harm could support an IIED claim:
  

  “It is enough that the actor knows that severe distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result.” (citing Cafferty)【6】.

Importance:
This shows the judge understood Minnesota law allows IIED claims where the defendant acts knowing it would cause distress, not just recklessly. The case of Cafferty was squarely before the court and recognized.

🔎 2. June 16, 2023 – Summary Judgment Dismissal of IIED Claim (Doc. 429)

Judge Miller’s reasoning:

• Held that Plaintiffs “cite no case, in this or any other jurisdiction, where an emotional distress claim was sustained based on such a theory, and the Court discovers none.” (p. 28)【7】.
• Ignored Cafferty — the exact case Plaintiffs cited four times, which he himself cited six months earlier.
• Dismissed the IIED claim, treating Sean’s post-notification letters and forwarding of emails to Marie’s father [] as non-actionable:
  • “The Court cannot conclude that Sean’s decision to continue his course of conduct, after becoming aware of Marie’s distress, rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (p. 28)【7】.

🔎 3. Omission of Key Evidence

The summary judgment order completely omitted the following critical pieces of evidence that were in the record:

• Three IME reports, including one from the defense’s own expert that supported Marie’s severe emotional distress.
• Video evidence (date and time-stamped) of Marie’s panic attack at the moment she learned Sean contacted [Marie’s father].
• Additional security videos showing two more panic attacks directly linked to Sean’s repeated contact with [Marie’s father].
• Emails sent to Sean detailing Marie’s trauma history and panic attacks—ignored by Sean, then sent by him to [Marie’s father] after knowing about Marie’s mental health crisis.
• Marie’s 1987 medical records documenting her longstanding extreme fear of her father.
• Craig’s handgun purchase in 1992 because of a serious threat from Marie’s father — further illustrating why contact with [Marie’s father] was a trigger.
• Defense counsel’s concession at oral argument that Sean continued contact with [Marie’s father] even after learning of Marie’s panic attack and history of abuse【7】.

🔎 4. Legal and Factual Significance of the Shift and Omissions

a. Misstatement of Law and Ignoring Precedent

• Judge Miller’s statement that Plaintiffs “cite no case” is factually incorrect because Plaintiffs cited Cafferty — the controlling Minnesota case that allows an IIED claim based on knowledge of likely harm.
• By ignoring Cafferty, Judge Miller applied the wrong legal standard, improperly raising the threshold for IIED to require new precedent, when Cafferty sufficed.

b. Omission of the Record’s Strongest Evidence of Severe Distress

• The videos, medical records, IMEs, and emails were direct evidence of severe emotional distress, foreseeability, and causation — all elements of IIED.
• This evidence created a clear question of fact on whether Sean’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous” — thus precluding summary judgment under Minnesota law.

c. Procedural Irregularity and Potential Appeal Issue

• The omission of cited caselaw and factual evidence central to Plaintiffs’ IIED claim suggests a clear error or oversight.
• It raises a potential due process issue — Plaintiffs were denied fair consideration of their strongest evidence and legal argument.

🔎 5. Conclusion

Judge Miller’s 2022 order recognized Marie had a viable IIED claim under Minnesota law.

• He cited Cafferty and understood Marie needed to prove Sean’s knowledge of likely distress.
• He explicitly stated a path to trial if facts supported knowledge and distress.

Judge Miller’s 2023 summary judgment order contradicts his own prior findings:

• Ignored the controlling Cafferty case.
• Excluded or failed to analyze critical evidence of distress and foreseeability.
• Dismissed the IIED claim based on a mischaracterization of both the law and the record.

✅ Recommendation / Legal Impact:

• Appellate issue: There is clear, appealable error based on legal misstatement, factual omission, and shifting standards.
• Material facts in dispute: The record creates genuine disputes, particularly whether Sean’s conduct (continuing after explicit warnings) was outrageous and whether the distress was severe — issues for a jury, not summary judgment.
• Violation of procedural fairness: Ignoring key evidence likely prejudiced Plaintiffs’ case.

In Skarsten, we reversed summary judgment for the insurer based on the resident-relative provision and cautioned “a court must not rely on selected facts in order to justify a conclusion.” 381 N.W.2d at 19. Here, the district court’s summary-judgment decision rested on “selected facts” because it ignored relevant evidence favorable to appellants’ position, drew inferences unfavorable to appellants, and failed to view the record evidence in a light favorable to appellants.

Progressive Ins. v. Abel, No. A21-1267, 2022 WL 2124869, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022)