Summary Judgment – The Standard

When a judge, such as Judge Miller, views evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party (Defendants in this case) rather than the non-moving party (Plaintiffs), it represents a significant departure from the proper legal standard for summary judgment. Under Minnesota law, as well as federal law, summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997)).

The significance of Judge Miller’s approach includes the following key concerns:

1. Misapplication of the Summary Judgment Standard

• The proper legal standard requires that courts view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (Plaintiffs in this case). This principle ensures that summary judgment is granted only when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.
• By viewing evidence in favor of the Defendants, Judge Miller effectively tilted the scales of justice, improperly resolving factual disputes that should have been left to a jury.

2. Impermissible Fact-Finding at Summary Judgment

• A judge at the summary judgment stage is not permitted to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve factual disputes (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
• If Judge Miller decided disputed issues of fact in favor of Defendants rather than recognizing them as genuine disputes requiring a trial, this suggests a fundamental error in applying the law.

3. Ignoring the Record of Disputed Issues

• If the record was filled with genuine factual disputes, the case should have proceeded to trial rather than being dismissed at summary judgment.
• Courts must allow factfinders (i.e., juries) to determine disputed issues, rather than resolving them in favor of one party at the pre-trial stage.

4. Potential Judicial Bias or Irregularities

• If a judge consistently misapplies the law in favor of one party, it raises questions about judicial impartiality.
• The pattern of decisions—ignoring clear factual disputes and favoring Defendants—could suggest systemic irregularities or bias.

5. Reversible Error on Appeal

• If properly challenged, such a ruling could be reversed on appeal because it conflicts with well-established precedent governing summary judgment.
• Appellate courts routinely overturn summary judgment decisions where a judge has improperly resolved factual disputes rather than allowing a jury to decide (Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993)).

Conclusion

Judge Miller’s approach—favoring Defendants at summary judgment, deciding factual disputes, and disregarding evidence of genuine issues—represents a serious legal error. It undermines the core principle that disputed factual matters must be decided by a jury, not a judge at summary judgment. If this pattern is repeated across multiple cases, it may indicate a broader issue of judicial misconduct or bias, warranting further scrutiny.

Justice-Denied Commentary

As a result of these discrepancies, Plaintiffs reviewed Judge Miller’s summary judgment orders in civil cases from June 1, 2018 through December 31, 2023 using Minnesota Court Records Online (MCRO) to determine how Judge Miller treated other parties at summary judgment. Plaintiffs found a total of 35 civil cases during this period where claims were decided by Judge Miller at summary judgment:

Click or tap the source index to enlarge it. The complete record remains available in a new browser tab.

Summary judgment orders for 33 cases were filed prior to Plaintiffs’ case (bolded above) and a summary judgment order for one case was filed after Plaintiffs’ case. These cases vary widely in their complexity, from simple consumer credit contracts to complicated cases involving shareholder fiduciary responsibilities and real estate disputes. However, in every single case other than Plaintiffs’, Judge Miller appears to have correctly applied the summary judgment standard, as outlined in Stringer and DLH, by granting or denying summary judgment based on the presence or absence of disputed material facts.

Judge Miller deviated from his typical practice in only one out of these thirty-five cases: Plaintiffs’:

Editorial Note: How Judge Miller Applied the Standard in Other Cases

Editorial update (August 2026): The later review of 35 civil summary-judgment cases found that Judge Miller generally stated and applied the proper standard. Stevenson was the outlier. The examples below show how he ordinarily treated factual disputes and credibility.

Schumacher-Cookman v. Schumacher. “The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations at this stage in the proceedings.” In his September 8, 2020 order, Judge Miller dismissed two alternative tort claims but allowed breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment to proceed because disputes involving credibility, reliance, and the parties’ competing accounts remained. After both parties later waived a jury, he conducted a bench trial and rejected those claims after hearing testimony and making credibility findings. The plaintiffs lost, but only after disputed facts were decided at the factfinding stage—a useful control for evaluating how comparable disputes were treated in Stevenson. Read the final findings and order.

Kaste v. The Rusty Nail. “Therefore, a jury could find that Kaste’s injuries were proximately caused by Spilde’s intoxication.” He recognized that competing inferences created a jury question and precluded summary judgment. Order, at 10.

AgCountry Farm Credit Services PCA v. Wayland State Bank. “Here, there is no question that there is a material fact in dispute.” Judge Miller denied summary judgment after finding that the disputed fact and supporting evidence were sufficient. Order, at 4.

Carey v. Clay County. “There are no issues of material fact ... Clay County is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.” This provides the opposite control: summary judgment followed a finding that no material dispute remained. Order, at 18.

Taken together, these orders show that Judge Miller knew and ordinarily applied the proper standard. His treatment of factual disputes and credibility in Stevenson differed from his treatment of those issues in the comparison cases.