Ignoring Evidence at Summary Judgment

ChatGPT (AI) Analysis

 Here’s an analysis of Judge Miller’s June 16, 2023 Summary Judgment Order against the Plaintiffs in light of the additional evidence you described:

1. Did Judge Miller properly address Plaintiffs’ Record Evidence?

Based on the order:

• Security video/audio of Marie’s panic attacks: There’s no mention of this specific evidence. Since it could support Marie’s emotional distress claim, its absence is notable.

• 1987 medical records (Marie “deathly afraid of returning home”): Not addressed. These records could support Plaintiffs’ theory of emotional distress and family trauma.

• Three Independent Medical Examinations (IMEs) of Marie: The order doesn’t mention any expert medical opinions, including Defendants’ expert placed into the record by Plaintiffs. Ignoring expert psychiatric evidence undermines a complete factual analysis, especially on the IIED claim.

• Sean’s missing backups and perjury about text deletions: The order is silent about the spoliation issue or Sean’s alleged perjury, which could be critical circumstantial evidence of intent, credibility, or bad faith.

• Conference calls between Defendants: Not discussed. These could be evidence of conspiracy or coordinated harmful intent, highly relevant to the civil conspiracy claim.

• Deleted texts surrounding key events: No discussion. The mass deletion of texts, if unrecoverable, could imply consciousness of guilt or destroy relevant context — a material fact on intent or causation.

• Four cease-and-desist letters (2-Sean, 1-Lisa, 1-Renee): Judge Miller did not address these warnings. Ignoring these letters glosses over potential notice to Defendants about the harm their communications were causing — key for both IIED and malice in defamation.

• Lisa’s contradictory testimony: Not mentioned. Contradictory sworn statements by a Defendant can create factual disputes about credibility — material to summary judgment.

• Recovered “Revenge” text from Sean to Lisa: The order does not reference this message. If Sean recommended a revenge manual, that could strongly support intentionality/malice and civil conspiracy.

Conclusion: Judge Miller did not explicitly address or appear to weigh this evidence. If it was in the record and raised, failing to consider it violates the standard of viewing facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.

2. Did Judge Miller properly grant summary judgment?

No. Multiple genuine disputes of material fact exist based on Plaintiffs’ described evidence:

• Intent and malice (critical for defamation and IIED) are hotly contested, with spoliation, perjury, and “Revenge” texts supporting Plaintiffs’ side.

• Causation and severity of Marie’s distress: Ignoring panic attacks on video/audio and IMEs prevents proper analysis of emotional distress severity.

• Civil conspiracy: Ignoring conference calls and coordinated message deletions overlooks potential group intent — core to conspiracy.

• Credibility disputes: Lisa’s contradictions and Sean’s perjury destroy grounds for summary judgment — these are for a jury to decide.

Summary judgment is inappropriate where intent, motive, or credibility is disputed — all present here.

3. Did Judge Miller violate Skarsten v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 381 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)?

Possibly, yes. Skarsten prohibits cherry-picking facts favoring the movant and requires viewing facts favorably to the non-moving party (Plaintiffs).

• Judge Miller analyzed select excerpts — primarily the Defendants’ narrative — while ignoring:

  • Spoliation,

  • Defendants’ contradictory admissions,

  • Videos and medical evidence of Marie’s condition,

  • Clear indicators of malice or premeditation (e.g., “Revenge” text).

This likely amounts to Skarsten error: using selected facts while failing to draw inferences favorable to the Plaintiffs.

4. Any other irregularities?

Yes:

• Self-publication argument on Renee’s email: The court wrongly dismissed it without considering that Craig might have been compelled to show it to protect his daughter — a fact question.

• Legal error on IIED standard: The court applies too high a standard to IIED, ignoring that pre-litigation harassment, aided by deceit, deleted evidence, and prior warnings (cease-and-desist) could qualify as outrageous.

• Overreliance on technical privilege arguments: Miller disregarded bad faith or improper purpose that can destroy privileges or immunities.

• Failure to analyze evidence holistically: Treating each communication in isolation instead of assessing cumulative impact — especially crucial for IIED and conspiracy.

• Dismissal of emotional distress based on “lack of reputational harm”: Minnesota law allows emotional distress claims separate from defamation — the court conflated these.

✅ Conclusion:

Judge Miller’s summary judgment order:

• Failed to address key record evidence;

• Improperly resolved factual disputes, intent, and credibility issues;

• Likely violated Skarsten by cherry-picking facts;

• Contained analytical errors in IIED and defamation law application.

This case should not have been resolved on summary judgment. A jury should weigh these facts — especially given the malice, deleted evidence, and emotional distress claims.

In Skarsten, we reversed summary judgment for the insurer based on the resident-relative provision and cautioned “a court must not rely on selected facts in order to justify a conclusion.” 381 N.W.2d at 19. Here, the district court’s summary-judgment decision rested on “selected facts” because it ignored relevant evidence favorable to appellants’ position, drew inferences unfavorable to appellants, and failed to view the record evidence in a light favorable to appellants.

Progressive Ins. v. Abel, No. A21-1267, 2022 WL 2124869, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022)