Selective Use of Legal Sources

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Adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts by the Minnesota Supreme Court for IIED Claims

The Minnesota Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) claims. Minnesota courts have traditionally relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 when analyzing IIED claims, particularly the requirement that the defendant’s conduct must be extreme and outrageous and must cause severe emotional distress.

In Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993), the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the elements of IIED using the Restatement (Second) of Torts. More recent cases, such as Langeslag v. KYMN, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2003), have continued to rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. The Restatement (Third) of Torts attempts to refine these principles, but there is no definitive ruling from the Minnesota Supreme Court that replaces the Restatement (Second) of Torts with the Restatement (Third) of Torts for IIED claims.

Significance of Judge Kevin Miller Citing the Restatement (Third) of Torts Instead of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

In the summary judgment order, Judge Kevin Miller cites the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 to justify the dismissal of the IIED claim. His reasoning includes:

• The high standard for “extreme and outrageous” conduct: He emphasizes that IIED is “sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts” and that it does not extend to insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or trivial oppressions.
• Gatekeeping function: Judge Miller notes that courts must determine whether conduct “may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery” before allowing a jury to decide.
• Public policy considerations: He references Restatement (Third) of Torts § 46, cmt. e, which states that merely exercising a legal right cannot be actionable as IIED.

However, his reliance on the Restatement (Third) of Torts is notable because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not formally adopted it for IIED claims. This could suggest that Judge Miller is applying a more restrictive standard than what Minnesota precedent requires. If the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 were applied instead, the analysis might have allowed for broader interpretations of “extreme and outrageous” conduct.

Potential Implications

1. Judicial Overreach or Misapplication of Law?
   By citing the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Judge Miller may be applying a standard that has not been expressly adopted by Minnesota’s highest court. This could indicate a departure from established precedent and raise questions about whether he properly applied Minnesota law.

2. Higher Threshold for Plaintiffs
   The Restatement (Third) of Torts tends to narrow the scope of IIED claims, making it harder for plaintiffs to succeed. By citing it, Judge Miller imposes a stricter standard that may not align with prior Minnesota rulings.

3. Selective Use of Legal Standards
   If Judge Miller has relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in prior cases but chose to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts in this instance, it could suggest inconsistency in judicial reasoning.

Conclusion

Judge Miller’s decision to cite the Restatement (Third) of Torts rather than the Restatement (Second) of Torts for IIED claims is significant because it suggests a shift toward a stricter standard—one that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not formally endorsed. This choice may have influenced the outcome of the IIED claim by setting a higher bar for what qualifies as “extreme and outrageous” conduct, potentially to the detriment of the plaintiffs.