On June 2, 2025, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued a powerful reversal in Wakasugi v. 3M, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on claims of pregnancy discrimination and retaliatory discharge. However, just fourteen months earlier, on April 8, 2024, the same court—with Judge Randall Slieter on both panels—had affirmed a controversial summary judgment in Stevenson v. Stevenson, a defamation and IIED case rife with discovery irregularities, evidentiary disputes, and documented misconduct by the defendants. The two rulings stand in sharp contrast, revealing an unsettling inconsistency in the appellate court’s approach to summary judgment—particularly when facts are disputed and credibility is central.
Wakasugi v. 3M: A Model of Proper Summary Judgment Reversal
In Wakasugi, the plaintiff presented extensive circumstantial evidence that her pregnancy and scheduled parental leave were motivating factors in 3M’s decision to eliminate her position during a corporate restructuring. Despite the employer’s argument that a neutral skills assessment justified the termination, the Court of Appeals found ample evidence of pretext:
- Preselection: Wakasugi’s name was entered in internal spreadsheets and emails as the person to be cut before any assessment took place.
- Timing and Communication: Supervisors acknowledged knowing of her pregnancy and leave plans at the time of selection.
- Inconsistent Documentation: Her year-end review, submitted hours before the assessment, was glowing—yet she scored the lowest and was the only employee criticized in the assessment.
- Credibility Conflicts: Managers gave contradictory testimony about who made the decision and when.
Judge Chutich, writing for the panel (which included Chief Judge Frisch and Judge Slieter), emphasized that credibility and motive are for the jury—not the judge—to resolve. The court carefully applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and held that “a reasonable juror could determine that the timing of her pregnancy and maternity leave…was a motivating factor in the decision to eliminate her position.”
Stevenson v. Stevenson: A Stark Contrast
In Stevenson, the plaintiffs brought claims of defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against relatives who had made inflammatory statements suggesting abuse, theft, and even attempted murder. The district court granted summary judgment despite:
- Allegations of Spoliation: A defendant admitted under oath to deleting text messages and then lied about it—yet the district court dismissed the significance of this misconduct.
- Factual Ambiguities: The court determined that statements about a party being “capable of murder” or having “stolen” from a spouse were not defamatory per se, even though they were made to third parties, including family members.
- Contradictory Testimony: The court repeatedly interpreted ambiguous statements in favor of the movants, dismissing the claims as a matter of law.
Judge Slieter, writing the opinion, concluded that none of the statements were actionable, that the IIED claim could not survive unless the plaintiff was the direct recipient of communications, and that spoliation sanctions were discretionary and did not justify reconsideration of summary judgment.
Unlike in Wakasugi, where all doubts were resolved in favor of the non-moving party, Stevenson reads as if the plaintiffs were required to conclusively prove their case just to survive summary judgment. Context, motive, and credibility were not seen as jury questions but were decided definitively by the court.
The Common Denominator: Judge Randall Slieter
Judge Randall Slieter sat on both panels. Yet his approach in Wakasugi—deferential to juries and careful not to weigh credibility—contrasts sharply with his authorship in Stevenson, which treated questions of meaning, intent, and motive as legal issues fit for judicial resolution. This raises serious concerns about the consistent application of Minnesota’s summary judgment standard.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01, summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” That standard is supposed to be rigorous and protective of the right to trial. As Wakasugi correctly recognized, circumstantial evidence, motive, and context must be evaluated by a jury when reasonable minds could differ. But Stevenson inexplicably abandoned that principle.
Why It Matters
The discrepancy between these two opinions sends a troubling message. When appellate judges shift their approach depending on the case or parties before them, they erode public trust in judicial neutrality. What is considered “a jury question” in one case is treated as a closed issue of law in another—despite obvious factual conflicts.
For litigants alleging torts like defamation or IIED, or seeking redress for discovery abuse, Stevenson signals a high bar for judicial sympathy—particularly when the defendants are family members or enjoy deference from the bench. Meanwhile, Wakasugi reaffirms the basic tenet that justice requires fair process and that disputes over intent must go to trial.
The Minnesota judiciary owes its citizens more than procedural efficiency. It owes them consistency, fairness, and a commitment to ensuring that the right to a jury trial is not sacrificed on the altar of judicial expedience.
Read more about how Otter Tail County Judge Kevin Miller viewed material facts at summary judgment in Stevenson v. Stevenson:
For more on judicial ethics and court reform in Minnesota, visit https://justice-denied.org.
