Catherine McEnroe Disciplinary Stipulation

Accessible document transcript

[Page 1]
FILE NO. _____________
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
--------------------------------------------------
In Re Petition for Disciplinary ActionSTIPULATION FOR DISPENSING
against CATHERINE A. McENROE, WITH PANEL PROCEEDINGS
a Minnesota Attorney, AND FOR FILING PETITION
Registration No. 0219587. FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
--------------------------------------------------

THIS STIPULATION is entered into by and between the Director of the Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) through its Deputy Director, Binh T.
Tuong, and Catherine A. McEnroe, attorney (respondent).
WHEREAS, respondent has concluded it is in respondent’s best interest to enter
into this stipulation,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and
between the undersigned as follows:
1. It is understood that respondent has the right to have charges of
unprofessional conduct heard by a Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Panel
prior to the filing of a petition for disciplinary action, as set forth in the Rules on
Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). Pursuant to Rule 10(a), RLPR, the parties
agree to dispense with panel proceedings under Rule 9, RLPR, and respondent agrees
to the immediate filing of a petition for disciplinary action (petition) in the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
2. Respondent understands that upon the filing of this stipulation and the
petition, this matter will be of public record.
3. It is understood that respondent has certain rights pursuant to Rule 14,
RLPR. Respondent waives these rights, which include the right to a hearing before a
October 25, 2023

[Page 2]
2
referee on the petition; to have the referee make findings and conclusions and a
recommended disposition; to contest such findings and conclusions; and to a hearing
before the Supreme Court upon the record, briefs and arguments. Respondent admits
service of the petition.
4. Respondent waives the right to answer and unconditionally admits the
allegations as described in the petition.
5. Respondent understands that, based upon these admissions, this Court
may impose any of the sanctions set forth in Rule 15(a)(1) - (9), RLPR, including making
any disposition it deems appropriate. Respondent understands that by entering into
this stipulation, the Director is not making any representations as to the sanction the
Court will impose.
6. The Director and respondent join in recommending that the appropriate
discipline is a 60-day suspension pursuant to Rule 15, RLPR. The suspension shall be
effective immediately as of the date of the Court’s suspension order. Reinstatement is
conditioned upon: (1) payment of $900 in costs and disbursements pursuant to
Rule 24(d), RLPR; (2) compliance with Rule 26, RLPR; (3) successful completion of the
professional responsibility examination pursuant to Rule 18(e); and (4) satisfaction of
the continuing legal education requirements pursuant to Rule 18(e), RLPR.
7. This stipulation is entered into by respondent freely and voluntarily,
without any coercion, duress or representations by any person except as contained
herein.
8. Respondent acknowledges receipt of a copy of this stipulation.
9. Respondent has been advised by the undersigned counsel concerning this
stipulation and these proceedings generally.

[Page 3]
3
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties executed this stipulation on the dates
indicated below.

BINH T. TUONG1
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Attorney No. 0297434
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 2400
St. Paul, MN 55101-2139
(651) 296-3952
Binh.Tuong@courts.state.mn.us
DEANNA N. NATOLI
SENIOR ASSISANT DIRECTOR
Attorney No. 0390865
Deanna.Natoli@courts.state.mn.us
Dated: , 2023.
CATHERINE A. McENROE
RESPONDENT
Attorney No. 0219587
Dated: , 2023.
JEANETTE M. BAZIS
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
Attorney No. 0255646
222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612) 373-8358
jbazis@greeneespel.com

1 Susan M. Humiston is recused from this case and has not taken part in these
proceedings.
October 24,
October 24

[Page 4]
4
MEMORANDUM
There is no doubt respondent’s conduct is serious as it concerns a knowingly false
statement to the court and additional dishonest conduct to cover up the false statement.
The Court has viewed false statements to the court as serious and has suspended
attorneys for such conduct.See In re Michael, 836 N.W.2d 753, 758-59, 767 (Minn. 2013)
(suspending lawyer for 30 days for, among other misconduct, making a false statement
to a court); In re Warpeha, 802 N.W.2d 361, 361 (Minn. 2011) (suspending a lawyer for 60
days for making a false statement about the lawyer’s criminal history during voir dire
when the lawyer was a potential juror); In re Van Liew, 712 N.W.2d 758, 758 (Minn. 2006)
(suspending a lawyer for 90 days for making a false statement to a tribunal and failing
to file opposition to a motion); In re Winter, 770 N.W.2d 463 (Minn. 1987) (120-day
suspension for attorney with disciplinary history and a number of aggravating factors,
who made a knowingly false statement to the court in a Lozada motion). Further, the
Court has also expressed concerns about whether misconduct committed by a
prosecutor warrants heightened discipline due to the breach of public trust. See, In re
Bloomquist, 987 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 2023). These factors have been taken into
consideration by the Director when addressing the appropriate level of discipline.
The Director could not find a Minnesota case exactly on point, though there have been
cases of misconduct by prosecutors that involve dishonesty that provide guidance. In
In re Fink, 2008 WL 11186118 (Minn. 2008), the Court publicly reprimanded a prosecutor
for failing to disclose to defense counsel the existence of previously undisclosed records
of scientific tests conducted on behalf of the prosecution and failed to correct a prior
false statement made to the court that the underlying test data had been destroyed. In
Fink, the Court specifically noted that there was no evidence that the failure to disclose
came from any attempt to intentionally mislead either the defense or the court. In In re
Mollin, 906 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 2018), the Court suspended a prosecutor for 60 days for
knowingly making false statements in discovery responses and disclosures and failing
to disclose and/or timely disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, which unduly
delayed the criminal proceedings. The misconduct in Mollin spanned two separate
cases and concerned two instances of dishonesty.
Other jurisdictions have considered cases with similar elements that are instructive.
Matter of Hansen, 877 P.2d 802 (Ariz. 1994), concerned a prosecutor who lied to the court
to cover up her error in prematurely releasing her witness. In Hanson, the court
censured the attorney rather than suspend her, reasoning a censure was appropriate
because the attorney had no prior disciplinary record, demonstrated remorse for her
actions, made full and free disclosure and was fully cooperative throughout the
disciplinary proceedings. Though Hanson concerned a single instance of dishonesty, it

[Page 5]
5
has many similar mitigating factors with respondent’s case making it particularly
instructive.

InMatter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Sanders, 494 N.W.2d 430 (Wis. 1993), the
prosecutor received a 60-day suspension for engaging in misconduct in two cases. In
the first matter, the prosecutor falsely informed the court scheduling clerk that the
criminal matter was settled causing the case to be removed from the trial calendar and
resulting in dismissal of the matter. In the second matter, Sanders falsely told defense
counsel that the jail had a policy against allowing work release privileges for inmates
seeking employment. In Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Association v. Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1994), the prosecutor received a three-month
suspension for falsely stating he had personally examined a serialized list of monies and
could guarantee they matched up (they did not) when confronted with a
chain-of-custody problem during the trial of a criminal case.

The Director believes, based on the comparable cases, that a 60-day suspension is
appropriate for respondent. While this case concerns misconduct that occurred in a
single case, it involved two separate instances of dishonesty (making a false statement
to the court and then inducing another to write a new note and submitting it to cover
up the false statement). The cases that are most comparable are Mollin and Sanders,
which involve two instances of dishonest conduct.

But this matter also has numerous mitigating factors that were not present in Mollin or
Sanders. Respondent has demonstrated deep remorse and has taken full accountability
for her actions. Respondent recognizes the harm she caused to the victim, the court,
and the justice system and places full responsibility on herself. Demonstration of true
remorse is a mitigating factor. In re Bloomquist, 987 N.W.2d at 212.

Further, respondent was facing extreme stress in her personal life with the death of her
former spouse in 2020 and solely caring for a now-adult special needs son. Respondent
also had unaddressed vicarious trauma stemming from her job as a county attorney (in
particular, working with child rape victims) which was exacerbated by the added stress
from her workload and added responsibilities. While extreme stress would normally
not mitigate dishonest conduct, in this case it was a factor giving rise to the misconduct.
Respondent has since sought help from a mental health professional and is seeking
treatment to address these issues. Respondent has reflected on her conduct, recognizes
the root cause of it and has taken steps to address the underlying issue.

Finally, there are no aggravating factors. Respondent’s false statement had no bearing
on the case, nor did it have substantive value. Indeed, respondent cannot explain why
she made the false statement, other than to reflect on the extreme pressure she was

[Page 6]
6
facing at the time. In cases where the Court has aggravated the level of discipline due
to prosecutorial misconduct, the conduct typically involved intentional conduct
resulting in an abuse of power or denial of constitutional rights. See Bloomquist,987
N.W.2d at 211 (agreeing with the Director that cases in which the Court has viewed an
attorney’s position as a prosecutor to be an aggravating factor typically involve
intentional conduct resulting in an abuse of power or denial of constitutional rights).
This case does not involve abuse of power or a denial of constitutional rights. While
respondent’s misconduct resulted in a dismissal of the case on the motion of the
Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, the Director recognizes that there were alternatives
to the dismissal, and it was not the inevitable outcome of respondent’s misconduct. The
false statement was not substantive, there were other prosecutors who could have
completed the trial (with just one professional witness remaining), and defense
counsel’s motion for a dismissal was still pending with the court.

For the above reasons, the Director believes a 60-day suspension is consistent with the
established caselaw, recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct, fulfills the purpose
of discipline, and is appropriate in this case.