State v. Jones: Appellant’s Brief on Judicial Fact-Finding

Accessible document transcript

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A24-1451

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,
vs.

Mervel George Jones, III,

Appellant.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

KEITH M. ELLISON
State Attorney General
JACOB CAMPION
Assistant Attorney General
445 Minnesota Street
Suite 600
St. Paul, MN 55101

COREY HALLER
Mille Lacs County Attorney
Mille Lacs County Justice Center
225 Sixth Avenue Southeast
Milaca, MN 56353

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

By: REBECCA IRELAND
Assistant State Public Defender
Atty. License No. 0393076
540 Fairview Avenue North
Suite 300
St. Paul, MN 55104
(651) 219-4444

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

February 19, 2026

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................ 1

LEGAL ISSUE .................................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......................................................................................... 4

ARGUMENT

A new trial is required because Judge Quinn deprived Jones of his right to an impartial
judge when he conducted a deliberate independent fact investigation into Jones’s criminal
records, considered that extra-record information in determining that Jones waived his
right to be present, and disclosed the prejudicial results of the investigation in court. ....... 8

A. This Court reviews de novo whether a judge deprives a defendant of the right to an
impartial judge. ......................................................................................................... 9

B. The district court judge’s independent fact investigation, reliance on extra-record
facts, and disclosure of the results of his investigation contravened the clear rule
established in Dorsey and violated Jones’s right to an impartial judge. .................. 9

C. This Court must reverse the court of appeals’ decision and refuse to adopt a
circumstance-based exception to Dorsey. .............................................................. 13

1. The court of appeals’ decision contravenes well-established law. ............. 14

2. Finnegan does not establish an exception to Dorsey. ................................. 16

3. The directive in Finnegan to inquire into a defendant’s absence does not
necessitate an independent judicial fact investigation. ............................... 16

4. The requirement to “inquire” into factual circumstances before making a
legal determination is not a “unique circumstance” warranting a Dorsey
exception. .................................................................................................... 18

5. There is no reason to recognize an exception to Dorsey. ............................ 19

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6. Recognizing a Dorsey exception in this case would invite additional
exceptions, upend the doctrine, and erode judicial impartiality. ................. 20

D. The due process violation here is a structural error, requiring automatic
reversal. .................................................................................................................. 22

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 24

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

MINNESOTA STATUTES

Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 ....................................................................................... 18, 19
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2020) ................................................................................. 3
Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2020) ................................................................................. 3
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2020) ............................................................................... 3

MINNESOTA DECISIONS

Cuypers v. State,
711 N.W.2d 100 (Minn. 2006) ................................................................................. 9
Greer v. State,
673 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 2004) ............................................................................... 21
Matter of Welfare of A. J. G.,
No. A18-1854, 2019 WL 3000745 (Minn. App. July 8, 2019) .............................. 20
State v. Bauer,
245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1976) ............................................................................... 18
State v. Blanshan,
No. A14-1065, 2015 WL 4507811 (Minn. App. July 27, 2015) ............................ 20
State v. Boettcher,
2025 WL 3441382 (Minn. App. Dec. 1, 2025) ...................................................... 19
State v. Bowlby,
No. A25-0086, 2025 WL 1792874 (Minn. App. June 30, 2025) ........................... 19
State v. Dorsey,
701 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2005) ........................................................................ passim
State v. Duol,
25 N.W.3d 135 (Minn. 2025) .......................................................................... passim
State v. Ecker,
524 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1994) ............................................................................... 18
State v. Finnegan,
784 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2010) ........................................................................... 4, 15
State v. Jones,
No. A24-1451, 2025 WL 2902129 (Minn. App. Oct. 13, 2025) ...... 2, 3, 6, 7, 13, 15
State v. Leckner,
No. A19-1007, 2020 WL 3172651 (Minn. App. June 15, 2020) .......................... 20
State v. Lopez,
988 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2023) ........................................................................... 9, 22
State v. McCorquodale,
No. A21-0047, 2021 WL 5446915 (Minn. App. Nov. 22, 2021) .................... 19, 20

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State v. Munt,
831 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 2013) ............................................................................... 18
State v. Richards,
552 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1996) ............................................................................... 18
State v. Scudder,
No. A21-1081, 2022 WL 1532553 (Minn. App. May 16, 2022) ........................... 19
State v. Weidenbach,
No. 16-1166, 2017 WL 1548619 (Minn. App. May 1, 2017) ................................ 20
State v. Wigham,
967 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 2021) ............................................................................... 18

FEDERAL DECISIONS

Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991) ............................................................................................... 22
Bracy v. Gramley,
520 U.S. 899 (1997) ................................................................................................. 9
Gray v. Mississippi,
481 U.S. 648 (1987) ............................................................................................... 22
Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570 (1986) ................................................................................................. 9

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7 .................................................................................................. 9, 23
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ...................................................................................................... 9

OTHER

Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) .................................................................................... 18

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A24-1451

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,
vs.

Mervel George Jones, III,

Appellant.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Feb. 3, 2022 The state charge d appellant Mer vel Jones with first -degree assault,
domestic assault, and fleeing.
Jan. 8-12, 2024 The Honorable Matthew M. Quinn presided over a jury trial. The jury
found Jones guilty on all counts.
June 13, 2024 The district court committed Jones to prison.
Sept. 11, 2024 Jones appealed, claiming that under State v. Dorsey the district court
violated his due process right to an impartial judge.
Oct. 13, 2025 The court of appeals affirmed.
Jan. 21, 2026 This Court granted review.

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LEGAL ISSUE
Under this Court’s precedent in State v. Dorsey , a judge deprives a defendant of
their due process right to an impartial judge by independently investigating facts outside
of the record. This Court has never recognized an exception to this “bright-line rule.” Did
the district court violate Dorsey and deprive Jones of his right to an impartial judge when
it independently investigated Jones’s criminal records , relied upon extra -record facts to
determine that Jones waived his right to be present at trial, and disclosed the results of its
independent investigation in open court?
Rulings below:
Following a n evidentiary hearing inquiring into Jones’s absence from court, the
district court judge independently obtained and reviewed Jones’s criminal records and
revealed the results of that investigation when announcing his determination that Jones had
waived his right to be present at trial.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the judge’s independent factual
investigation was exempt from the rule in Dorsey and justified based on the “unique
circumstance” of having to inquire into Jones’s absence from court. State v. Jones , No.
A24-1451, 2025 WL 2902129, at *5 (Minn. App. Oct. 13, 2025).
Apposite authority:
State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135 (Minn. 2025)
State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2005)

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state charged appellant Mervel Jones III in Mille Lacs County District Court
with first -degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2020), domestic assault
under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2020), and fleeing under Minn. Stat. § 609.487,
subd. 6 (2020).
The matter proceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Matthew M. Quinn. On the
third day of trial, Jones did not appear. After holding an evidentiary hearing addressing
Jones’s absence, Judge Quinn conducted his own factual investigation. He obtained and
reviewed court records dating back to the year 2000 to gain additional facts about Jones
and disclosed the results of that investigation in court when announcing his finding that
Jones’s had waived his right to be presen t. At the end of trial, the jury found Jones guilty
on all counts, and Jones was sentenced to 192 months in prison.
Jones appealed, arguing that the district court violated his right to an impartial judge
by conducting an independent fact investigation, relying upon extra -record facts, and
announcing the results of its independent investigation in open court, in contravention of
the constitutional rule recognized in State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2005) . The
court of appeals affirmed . It reasoned that due to “ the unique circumstances” of the case
the bright-line rule identified in Dorsey, and reaffirmed in Duol, did not apply to this case
and the district court’s independent extra -record investigation was justified because the
district court was required to inquire into Jones’s absence from trial . State v. Jones , No.
A24-1451, 2025 WL 2902129, at *5 (Minn. App. Oct. 13, 2025).
This Court granted review of Jones’s Dorsey claim.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In February 2022 , Jones was charged with assaulting his significant other and
fleeing on foot in connection with his subsequent arrest. (Doc. No. 1). The Honorable
Matthew M. Quinn presided over the case, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.1
A. Judge Quinn’s on-the-record inquiry into Jones’s absence from court.
On the third day of trial, Jones did not appear. (T 307). Judge Quinn explained that,
under State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2010), he had to make a sufficient inquiry
into the circumstances of Jones’s absence before continuing with trial. (T 307 -08). Judge
Quinn noted that he received news that a sheriff’s sergeant who works in the courthouse
had relevant information regarding Jones’s recent activities and current status. (T 307-08).
The judge first inquired of the attorneys. (T 308 -10). Defense counsel reported that he
called and texted Jones but received no answer; he explained that Jones usually answers
his phone calls and that was their usual way of contacting each other. (T. 309). Counsel
stated that he had not received any indication that Jones would not be present. (T 309). The
state declined to introduce any evidence into the record.
Judge Quinn held an evidentiary hearing with the parties’ attorneys to more
adequately inquire into Jones’s absence and whether he waived his right to be present . (T
310). Pursuant to Rule 614(a) of the rules of evidence, which permits a district court to call
its own witnesses, Judge Quinn called the sheriff’s sergeant to testify as a fact witness. (T
310). The sergeant testified that as a “transport court security sergeant” his responsibilities

1 “T” refers to the transcript of the jury trial held January 8-12, 2024.

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include determining if “any[one] [who] shows up for court or might show up for court” has
an active warrant for their arrest. (T 311-12). The sergeant testified that he ran Jones for
warrants and learned from a computer entry that the Department of Corrections (DOC)
issued a “release violator” warrant for Jones for having cut off his DOC ankle monitor and
leaving his treatment facility around 10:30 p.m. the previous night. (312-13). He confirmed
that Jones was currently “wanted” by the DOC. (312). The deputy further testified that he
was familiar with DOC ankle monitors and personally observed Jones wearing an ankle
monitor in court the previous two days of trial. (T 313-14).
After the evidentiary hearing concluded, the judge and attorneys addressed other
trial business and took a break. (T 315-28).
B. Judge Quinn’s independent investigation into Jones’s criminal records.

While in recess, unbeknownst to the parties, Judge Quinn sought and reviewed
records from other district court files, including juvenile and other confidential records
dating back to 2000, that involved Jones. (T 329).
After recess, Judge Quinn announced his finding that Jones voluntarily waived his
right to be present and cited the facts that “contribute to this finding.” (T 328). Judge Quinn
first noted the record facts that the state filed an aggravated sentence notice in this case,
there had been discussions regarding a potentially lengthy sentence, and Jones had been
released from prison just a month and a half earlier and was currently on intensive
supervised release and, therefore, “was well aware of the system and how it works .” (T
328-29). Judge Quinn then disclosed extra-record facts that he obtained from other court
records:

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There is an order from Chief of our District Judge, Sarah Hennesy, in
a 2015 file that finds [Jones] a danger to public safety, so he would be on
notice of, you know, knowledge of that order -- that finding. MNCIS has
records that go back a fair bit. The f irst one dated for Mr. Jones is the year
2000. He was still a juvenile, but since then 33 warrants have been issued
against him, as an approximate number. There could be more, because
MNCIS is a party-based system. If his name wasn’t linked to those incidents
properly, there could be more than that. But, it’s at least 33.
And then according to the 2015 Presentence Investigation that
produced Chief Hennesy’s danger to public safety order, it’s noted that he’s
a former member of the Native Mob street gang and has “Native Mob”
tattooed on his forearm.
So, it’s clear to me [Jones has] absented himself intentionally, it’s
voluntary, and defendant has intentionally abandoned a known right to be
present at trial.

(T 329). Trial continued without Jones.
C. The appeal
On appeal, as relevant here, Jones claimed that the district court demonstrated
emergent bias under State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2005). He argued that Judge
Quinn’s act of independently seeking and obtaining extra-record information by reviewing
his criminal records deprived him of his right to an impartial judge and created a structural
error. Jones also argued that Judge Quinn violated his right to an impartial judge by further
disclosing the results of his independent investigation in open court and considering extra-
record facts in deciding that he waived his presence at trial. Jones argued that because the
uniformly applied rule established in Dorsey prohibits the judicial conduct that occurred
here, automatic reversal was required.
The court of appeals agreed that the district court independently investigated and
“gathered” extra-record facts from other court files. Jones, 2025 WL 2902129, at *5. The
court of appeals also acknowledged that Dorsey preserved “the bright-line rule ” that

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prohibits a judge from investigating facts in evidence , a due process principle that this
Court reaffirmed during the pendency of Jones’s appeal in Duol. Id. at *4. Nonetheless, the
court of appeals held that, because Judge Quinn had an obligation to inquire into the
voluntariness of Jones’s absence at trial, the due process prohibitions identified in Dorsey
and Duol did not apply and Judge Quinn was justified in independently investigating facts
in Jones’s criminal records. Id. at *5.
This Court granted review.

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ARGUMENT
A new trial is required because Judge Quinn deprived Jones of his right to an
impartial judge when he conducted a deliberate independent fact investigation into
Jones’s criminal records, considered that extra-record information in determining
that Jones waived his right to be present , and disclosed the prejudicial results of the
investigation in court.

In direct contravention of due process requirements of impartiality, the district court
judge became an independent investigator in the matter before him. The judge deliberately
conducted an independent fact investigation into Jones’s prior records, relied on what he
learned from that investigation to inform whether Jones waived his right to be present at
trial, and disclosed the highly prejudicial results of his investigation in open court. This
conduct is a textbook example of constitutional error under Dorsey.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, Judge Quinn’s independent extra-
record investigation was neither justified by the “unique circumstances” of the case nor
exempt from due process principles identified in Dorsey, which uniformly bar a court from
independently investigating facts or deciding issues beyond the facts presented in court. As
this Court has done in the past, it must reject the court of appeals’ flexible application of
Dorsey, reaffirm the uniform application of the constitutional doctrine, and hold that the
district court’s deliberate independent fact investigation deprived Jones of his due process
right to an impartial judge. A new trial must be granted to remedy this structural error.

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A. This Court reviews de novo whether a judge deprives a defendant of the
right to an impartial judge.

Jones’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial judge is a
legal question, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Lopez , 988 N.W.2d 107, 120
(Minn. 2023).
B. The district court judge’s independent fact investigation, reliance on
extra-record facts, and disclosure of the results of his investigation
contravened the clear rule established in Dorsey and violated Jones’s
right to an impartial judge.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
7 of the Minnesota Constitution entitle criminal defendants to due process. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. These due process rights include the fundamental
right to a fair trial and “a fair and impartial judge.” Cuypers v. State, 711 N.W.2d 100, 104
(Minn. 2006) (citing Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904 –05 (1997)); see also Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (“The state of course must provide a trial befor e an impartial
judge . . . .”). An impartial court process “requires that conclusions reached by the trier of
fact be based upon the facts in evidence,” and “prohibits the trier of fact from reaching
conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” State v.
Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 249 –50 (Minn. 2005). “This is because t he very act of seeking
information outside the record effectively transforms the court into an investigator thereby
eliminating any vestige of impartiality.” State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 143 (Minn. 2025)
(citation modified).
In Dorsey, this Court recognized there is “a bright-line rule that judges may not
engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251;

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see also Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at 119 (reaffirming this principle).
In Duol, this Court declined to recognize an exception to Dorsey and reaffirmed that
under the due process guarantees of the state and federal constitutions, “there is a bright-
line rule that prohibits the trier of fact from conducting deliberate independent
investigations of extra-record facts and then considering those facts.” Id. at 142 (quotation
omitted). In so holding, this Court explained:
When a district court judge [engages in an independent fact investigation]
they no longer act as a fair and impartial judge . We have never recognized
an exception to this guardrail. Even though we have acknowledged that
adopting a more flexible standard may result in a less distasteful outcome in
some cases, we have said that our failure to apply this rule uniformly “would
permanently compromise the bedrock principle in our criminal justice system
that judges may not investigate or rely upon extra -record knowledge when
sitting as the finder of fact.”

Id. at 141 (quoting Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251 ). This Court clarified that this bright-line
rule is separately and independently required by the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. at 144.
Judge Quinn violated this well-established rule . There is no dispute that a fter
conducting an on-the-record inquiry into Jones’s absence, Judge Quinn conducted his own
fact investigation by independently obtaining and reviewing Jones’s court records, dating
back to 2000 when Jones was a juvenile , and used what he learned from those records to
find that Jones waived his right to be present at trial. Judge Quinn was prohibited from
engaging in this conduct. By deliberately conducting his own investigation of facts, the
judge necessarily lost his impartiality—he could “ no longer act as a fair and impartial
judge.” See id. at 141. Judge Quinn violated a fundamental principle of judicial neutrality

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that broadly prohibits a judge from independently investigating facts or reaching
conclusions “based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.” Dorsey,
701 N.W.2d at 249–50. Judge Quinn’s independent investigation into Jones’s court records
was impermi ssible no matter the perceived relevance of the extra -record information
sought or the circumstances of the case.
The district court’s deliberate independent investigation in this case is like the
independent investigation into extra-record facts that occurred in Dorsey. There, the district
court judge had her clerk check court records to confirm the date of a relevant person’s
death and used that information to assess the credibility of statements that a defense witness
made at trial. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 243 –45. This Court reversed Dorsey’s conviction,
holding that he was denied his right to an impartial judge. Id. at 253.
Similarly, in Duol, after an evidentiary hearing on Duol’s postconviction claim, the
district court sought facts about the criminal history of a defense witness that were not
introduced into evidence and used that information in discrediting that witness’s testimony.
Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 137, 139. Applying the bright-line rule preserved in Dorsey, this Court
held that the district court violated Duol’s right to an impartial judge. Id. at 142.
The same holding is required here. As finder of fact, Judge Quinn was obligated to
inquire into the voluntariness of Jone s’s absence at trial based on facts presented in court
or otherwise a part of the record. He failed that obligation by independently sleuthing and
relying on extra -record evidence in that determination . In so doing, t he district court
deprived Jones of his right to an impartial judge.

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The judge’s improper conduct did not stop there. Judge Quinn committed an
additional constitutional violation by announcing what he learned from his independent
investigation in open court. Again, Dorsey controls. There, this Court found an additional
act of bias in the judge’s act of disclosing the results of her investigation in court. Dorsey,
701 N.W.2d at 251 (holding that this act too showed the “judge was not impartial”). This
Court reasoned that “when a judge possesses extra-record knowledge that is prejudicial to
a defendant in a criminal trial, the judge may not disclose that knowledge. Rather, the judge
must either disqualify herself or set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence
adduced in deciding the case.” Id. at 252. In announcing the results of his investigation,
Judge Quinn disclosed highly prejudicial details about Jones’s past that were not a part of
the record in this case. This adverse disclosure included that Jones is a former member of
“the Native Mob street gang” and has “’Native Mob’ tattooed on his forearm,” h e has a
juvenile record, he has had at least “33 warrants issued against him” but maybe more, and,
as discovered in a confidential sentencing record , a different judge found him to be “a
danger to public safety .” (T 329). And Judge Quinn certainly did not set aside that extra-
record information, as was required ; he expressly considered it in deciding Jones waived
his right to be present at trial . As this Court held in Dorsey, a judge who independently
investigates a fact not in evidence and reveals the results of that investigation to the parties
has deprived the defendant of their constitutional right to an impartial judge. Id. at 253.
The same conclusion is required here.
Judge Quinn violated clear and fundamental rules of judicial impartiality. Based on
this Court’s precedents, and the ir underlying due process guarantees, Judge Quinn’s

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deliberate independent fact investigation, consideration of extra -record facts, and
prejudicial disclosure of the results of that investigation violated Jones’s constitutional
right to an impartial judge.
C. This Court must reverse the court of appeals’ decision and refuse to
adopt a circumstance-based exception to Dorsey.

Here, for the first time, the court of appeals recognized an exception to the bedrock
principle that a judge may not independently investigate facts in evidence or rely on
evidence outside of what is presented in court. While knowing that no precedent endorses
such an exception , the court of appeals determined that given the “specific, unique
circumstances of this case ,” the bright-line rule in Dorsey and Duol do not apply. Jones,
2025 WL 2902129, at *5. The court of appeals reasoned that, because the district court had
to inquire into the voluntariness of Jones’s absence at trial, Judge Quinn was authorized to
conduct his own investigation of facts outside the record. Id.
Contrary to this novel interpretation of the due process rights at stake, Judge Quinn’s
independent investigation was neither justified by any “unique circumstances” of the case,
nor exempt from the constitutional prohibition identified in Dorsey, which uniformly bars
a court from independently investigating facts in deciding matters that come before it. The
decision below was wrongly decided and must not be upheld. For several important
reasons, discussed below, this C ourt should reverse the lower court and decline to
recognize an exception to Dorsey based on the circumstances the court of appeals
identified.

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1. The court of appeals’ decision contravenes well-established law.

First, the court of appeals ’ decision is simply untethered from precedent. Since
2005, the law in Minnesota has been that the constitutional principle that a judge may not
independently investigate facts in adjudicating matters that come before it is one of
“uniform,” not “flexible,” application. See Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251; see also Duol, 25
N.W.3d at 141. And there is no caselaw that authorizes the judicial conduct that took place
here or supports any exception to “the bedrock principle in our criminal justice system that
judges may not investigate or rely upon extra-record knowledge when sitting as the finder
of fact.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251. The reason there is no authority supporting the court
of appeals’ decision is an important one: the bright-line rule prohibiting independent
judicial fact investigations is not just a desirable policy this Court has opted to put in place,
it is a due process “requirement.” See Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 144 (holding “due process
requires a bright-line rule prohibiting independent judicial investigations into facts outside
the record” (emphasis added)).
The court of appeals’ determination that Judge Quinn was free to conduct his own
factual investigation depends upon a flexible interpretation of Dorsey, one that accepts that
in some circumstances a court ought to be allowed to conduct its own investigation.
Because this is the same rationale that this Court rejected in Dorsey, the court of appeals’
reasoning is not just unconvincing but unmoored from the relevant jurisprudence. See
Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251 (rejecting dissent’s position that judges should be allowed to
investigate to confirm “immutable facts ” and preserving a uniform rule) . The decision
below represents a significant and unsound departure from this Court’s precedents and the

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due process “guardrail” they preserve. The decision must be reversed.
2. Finnegan does not establish an exception to Dorsey.

Second, the lower court’s reliance on State v. Finnegan , 784 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.
2010) to support a Dorsey exception is misplaced. See Jones, 2025 WL 2902129, at *5.
Finnegan instructs, “When a defendant fails to appear for trial, the district court must make
a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant’s disappearance to justify a
finding whether the absence was voluntary.” Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 250 (quotation
omitted).2 Because of this requirement, the court of appeals determined that the prohibition
identified in Dorsey and Duol did not apply and therefore did not bar Judge Quinn from
conducting his own investigation and obtaining and considering Jones’s criminal records .
Jones, No. A24-1451, 2025 WL 2902129, at *5. In other words, according to the court of
appeals, Finnegan provides a special exemption from the uniformly applied rule that
prohibits a judge from engaging in an independent fact investigation or relying upon extra-
record facts. The court of appeals is wrong.
The requirement to sufficiently inquire into the voluntariness of a defendant’s
absence at trial does not authorize (let alone necessitate) an independent fact investigation.
This Court said nothing in Finnegan about a judge independently obtaining or weighing
facts beyond those developed in court in making the required findings, and nothing in
Finnegan sanctions or even encourages such conduct. The decision in Finnegan simply did

2 This Court also clarified that district court must “efficiently” make its finding , and it set
out a postconviction framework, which is not at issue here, for later rebutting that finding.
Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 250.

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not address the bright-line rule in Dorsey or the judicial conduct at issue here, and the court
of appeals’ reliance on Finnegan to hold that a carve-out exists to a bedrock constitutional
rule is misplaced. Finnegan did not establish a Dorsey exception; that is, it did not provide
that, under certain circumstances, a defendant’s right to an impartial judge can be violated.
Moreover, if Finnegan’s “inquire into” directive is read as authorizing a judge to
conduct its own, behind-closed-doors investigation of facts, the constitutionality of that
decision would have to be seriously called into question. Duol is again instructive. There,
this Court was asked to interpret a provision of the postconviction statute, which provides
that a district court judge presiding over a postconviction hearing “may inquire into . . . any
grounds for relief ,” as empowering the district court to independently investigate extra-
record facts. Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 142 . This Court declined to do so , reasoning that to
interpret the postconviction statute as authorizing independent judicial fact investigations
would not just strain the statutory text but “raise important questions regarding its
constitutionality.” Id. The same is true here.
3. The directive in Finnegan to inquire into a defendant’s absence does
not necessitate an independent judicial fact investigation.

Having established that Finnegan does not authorize an independent judicial fact
investigation, it must be stated that it too does not require one. To the extent Finnegan
requires a district court to adequately develop the record before finding whether a
defendant has voluntarily absented themselves from trial , the judge was able to do that
here—without needing to conduct his own investigation. The record bears this out. With
the parties present, Judge Quinn conducted a detailed, on -the-record inquiry into

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circumstances of Jones’s failure to appear and received evidence regarding Jones’s recent
activities including: since the previous night, Jones cut off the ankle monitoring device that
he had been wearing the previous two days in court, left his treatment facility, absconded
supervision, and was on warrant status and “wanted” by the DOC for a release violation.
(T 310-14). In addition, the attorneys were permitted an opportunity to cross -examine the
fact witness and present additional evidence into the record , and defense counsel was
directed to disclose his recent communications with Jones and attempts to reach him, which
counsel did. Thus, the court inquired. The court created the necessary record to determine
voluntariness.
This on -the-record inquiry shows that the district court knew how to properly
inquire into the relevant circumstances and had every ability to do so without running afoul
of its duty of impartiality . Thus, t he judge’s decision to subsequently conduct his own
private and sequestered investigation into Jones’s criminal records was not just
unconstitutional but wholly unnecessary.3 Neither the directive in Finnegan nor the case-
specific circumstances justified the court in investigatisng facts on its own or resolving the
waiver matter based on facts never adduced in court. The judge’s independent investigation
was impermissible and gratuitous. Simply, the requirement under Finnegan to inquire into

3 It bears questioning how investigating Jones’s criminal records and what Jones was doing
years, even decades, earlier was relevant to the matter at hand: what he was doing that
morning. Supposed gang connection s and prior misdeeds have no bearing on whether he
was voluntarily absent that day, and the court’s investigation into and ultimate reliance on
those inflammatory extra-records facts in its waiver decision makes the court’s independent
investigation all the more troubling.

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the circumstances of Jones’s absence neither authorized nor necessitate d Judge Quinn’s
extra-record actions.
4. The requirement to “inquire” into factual circumstances before
making a legal determination is not a “unique circumstance”
warranting a Dorsey exception.

Relatedly, the general premise underlying the court of appeals’ decision that an
“inquiry” into the voluntariness of a defendant’s absence could constitute a “unique
circumstance” supporting an independent judicial fact investigation is rather inexplicable.
Courts are built to conduct inquiries—it is what they do. Routinely, judges are called upon
to “inquire” into factual circumstances to make legal determinations, and they do so in a
myriad of contexts , all while being required to maintain judicial impartiality and reach
decisions based solely on facts presented in court . See State v. Bauer , 245 N.W.2d 848,
856 (Minn. 1976) (court must “inquire” into mental illness and deficiency when presented
with uncontradicted suggestion of incompetence); State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994) (court must “inquire” into factual basis for a guilty plea); State v. Richards,
552 N.W.2d 197, 210 (Minn. 1996) (court “must inquire” into effects of outside influence
on jury when confronted with that possibility); State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn.
2013) (court must conduct “searching inquiry” into circumstances of alleged
ineffectiveness of appointed counsel to determine if substitute counsel is warranted); State
v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 2021) (court must inquire into defendant’s ability
to pay before ordering restitution); Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) (setting out required
court inquiry to establish valid waiver of counsel); cf. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (court
“may inquire into” any grounds for relief in postconviction setting). Just as it would be

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improper for a judge to independently research relevant facts in making any of these
determinations, that conduct was improper here.
Furthermore, the fact that a district court is required to develop the factual record is
simply not a factor in determining whether a judge’s conduct violates the rule established
in Dorsey, nor is it a compelling reason to carve out an exception to that rule. Contrary to
the court of appeals’ rationale, Jones’s absence from court did not empower Judge Quinn
to do what he is uniformly prohibited from doing: “conducting deliberate independent
investigations of extra-record facts and then considering those facts.” Duol at 142. Dorsey
pronounced a rule without exception , and it should apply here irrespective of the type of
judicial inquiry at bar.
5. There is no reason to recognize an exception to Dorsey.
There is no need for this Court to create a Dorsey exception. For two decades, the
court of appeals has easily applied Dorsey as a bright -line rule and had done so in a
straightforward, unremarkable fashion across a wide range of judicial determinations and
procedural settings. See State v. Boettcher, 2025 WL 3441382, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 1,
2025) (extra-record investigation in determining admissibility of evidence at jury trial –
Dorsey violation); State v. Bowlby, No. A25-0086, 2025 WL 1792874, at *4 (Minn. App.
June 30, 2025) (extra -record investigation in dismissing counts of complaint for lack of
probable cause–Dorsey violation); State v. Scudder, No. A21-1081, 2022 WL 1532553, at
*4 (Minn. App. May 16, 2022) (quick Google search at restitution hearing —Dorsey
violation); State v. McCorquodale, No. A21-0047, 2021 WL 5446915, at *5 (Minn. App.
Nov. 22, 2021) (extra-record knowledge not set aside during bench trial–Dorsey violation);

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20

State v. Leckner , No. A19 -1007, 2020 WL 3172651, at *4 (Minn. App. June 15, 2020)
(extra-record investigation into prison treatment options at sentencing–Dorsey violation);
Matter of Welfare of A. J. G. , No. A18-1854, 2019 WL 3000745, at *3 (Minn. App. July
8, 2019) (extra-record investigation verifying “innocuous” fact in juvenile-delinquency
proceeding–Dorsey violation); State v. Weidenbach, No. 16-1166, 2017 WL 1548619, at *
2 (Minn. App. May 1, 2017) (extra -record investigation into co -defendant’s PSI at
sentencing—Dorsey violation); State v. Blanshan , No. A14 -1065, 2015 WL 4507811 , at
*2 (Minn. App. July 27, 2015) (consideration of order contained in defendant’s other court
records following bench trial–Dorsey violation).
This history of nonprecedential applications of Dorsey conveys something obvious
though important: the uniform standard is sound and workable, and its broad application
has been without qualification. There is no reason for this Court to now create a new rule.
6. Recognizing a Dorsey exception in this case would invite additional
exceptions, upend the doctrine, and erode judicial impartiality.

Finally, the decision below opens the door to lower courts finding additional Dorsey
exceptions based other perceived “unique circumstances” or case-specific rationalizations.
This would create the exact floodgates-problem—the opening of a “Pandora’s box”—that
this Court envisioned and attempted to shut in Dorsey. See Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251
(recognizing that dissent’s suggested limited exception “opens a judicial Pandora’s box
regarding if, when, and how” a judge may independently investigate facts). Accordingly,
this Court has repeatedly insisted upon a uniform standard.
But a uniform standard is not just convenient, it is “required.” Duol, 25 N.W.2d at

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21

141, 144 (holding “due process requires a bright-line rule prohibiting independent judicial
investigations into facts outside the record” because when a judge engages in that conduct
they “no longer act as a fair and impartial judge.” (emphasis added) ). Allowing an
exception to the rule recognized in Dorsey would simply upend the doctrine.
Another problem with recognizing even a limited exception to the prohibition
against independent judicial fact investigations is that doing so would undermine the core
tenet upon which our entire court system depends. See Greer v. State , 673 N.W.2d 151,
155 (Minn. 2004) ( “[I]mpartiality is the very foundation of the American judicial
system.”). This Court should thus be very wary of curtailing the fundamental right to an
impartial judge and the corresponding rules designed to protect that right . When it comes
to independent judicial fact investigation s, maintaining a uniformly applied standard is
both prudent and necessary to ensure judicial impartiality at all stages of the proceedings ,
in all decision-making. Accordingly, this Court should again preserve the bright-line rule
articulated in Dorsey and Duol that prohibits a judge from independently investigating facts
outside the record and decline to recognize a circumstance-specific exception in this case.
This Court should hold that the district court deprived Jones of his right to an
impartial judge because it conducted a deliberate independent fact investigation,
considered extra-record information in its wa iver decision, and disclosed the prejudicial
results from the extra-record investigation in open court in contravention of the bright-line
rule of due process preserved in Dorsey.

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D. The due process violation here is a structural error, requiring automatic
reversal.

This Court is required to reverse and remand for a new trial. The “deprivation of the
‘basic protection’ of an impartial judge is a ‘structural error’ that requires reversal without
questioning whether the error is harmless.” Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 143 (citing Dorsey, 701
N.W.2d at 253). “[S]tructural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism defy
analysis by harmless-error standards.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309
(1991)). The United States Supreme Court has specifically identified the denial of the right
to an impartial judge as one such structural defect. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ; see also
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 1 (1987) (“Some constitutional rights are so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be tr eated as harmless error. The right to an
impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right.” (citation modified)). Accordingly,
when a defendant has been deprived of an impartial judge, automatic reversal is required.”
Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 253; see also Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at 119.
In Duol, this Court rejected an argument that the district court’s Dorsey violation
was harmless error because the court’s postconviction decision would have been the same
regardless of its extra-record investigation. Duol, 25 N.W.3d at 143–44. Recognizing that
Dorsey and Lopez foreclose this rationale , this Court emphasized that a deliberate
independent investigation and use of extra -record facts is a structural defect “without
inquiry into whether the error would have changed the outcome.” Id. Accordingly,
“applying a harmless -error analysis would be inconsistent with the bright -line rule in
Dorsey,” federal due process , and the separate and independent due process guarantee of

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the Minnesota Constitution. See id. (clarifying that the “bright-line rule prohibiting
independent judicial investigations into facts outside the record” and proposition that “such
an investigation constitutes a structural error” are guaranteed separately and independently
by Minn. Const. art 1 § 7).
By violating Dorsey, the district court created a structural defect in Jones’s trial.
Because Jones’s due process rights were violated by the district court’s deliberate
independent investigation and consideration of extra -record facts, this Court must reverse
and remand for a new trial.

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CONCLUSION
Jones is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his due process right t o an
impartial judge.
Dated: February 19, 2026 Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

/s/ Rebecca Ireland

Rebecca Ireland
Assistant State Public Defender
License No. 0393076
540 Fairview Avenue North, Suite 300
St. Paul, MN 55104
(651) 219-4444

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT