Svendsen Memorandum Supporting Partial Summary Judgment (May 22, 2026)

Accessible document transcript

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State of Minnesota
County of Otter Tail
Stephen Roy Svendsen
Plaintiff,
v.
Pamela Joy Minten,
Ken Laney,
Mikel Bruce Olson,
Fergus Falls HRA,
Christopher Harold Harig,
Ryan Muchow,
City of Fergus Falls,
Defendants.
Seventh Judicial District
Civil Division
Case Type: Civil (Tort)
Civil No.: 56-CV-24-1426
Judge: Kevin M. Miller
Plaintiff’s Memorandum Of Law
In Support of Motion For Summary
Judgment on Breach of Contract;
Liability
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Stephen Svendsen moves for partial summary judgment on liability for breach
of contract — Count I, the sole surviving claim against the Fergus Falls Housing and
Redevelopment Authority (the “HRA”). The narrow question is whether the HRA non-
renewed Plaintiff’s Lease in compliance with the federal public-housing regulations the
Lease incorporates and that the HRA’s own Executive Director identified, in writing, as
the governing authority.
The undisputed record shows the HRA failed to comply on multiple independent
grounds, each fatal standing alone. The HRA’s own paper makes this case exceptional. On
September 19, 2022, Executive Director Mikel Olson emailed Housing Manager Pamela
Minten under the subject line “24 CFR 966.4” — identifying the controlling regulation
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in writing. Two days later, the HRA’s September 21, 2022 board minutes recited that “[t]
he Fergus Falls HRA received correspondence from Housing and Urban Development
that non-renewals need to include good cause for it to be an approved action.” The HRA’s
own contemporaneous documents establish, by party admission, that (i) 24 C.F .R. § 966.4
governs, and (ii) the HRA knew “good cause” was required.
Yet the HRA’s notices stated no good cause: the September 15, 2022 initial notice
stated no reasons at all; the September 27, 2022 amended notice cited only undefined
“harassment.” By the HRA’s own verified discovery responses, the only Lease provision
it invokes is Clause 16(12), and “harassment” carries only its plain dictionary meaning.
Neither Clause 16(12) nor the House Rules (Lease Attachment B) defines “harassment”
or reaches Plaintiff’s conduct — good-faith complaints to management and an inquiry to
the Fergus Falls Fire Department about fire-safety records.
The HRA’s procedural breaches are equally fatal: no specific notice content under §
966.4(l)(3); no document-examination opportunity under § 966.4(m); no grievance
hearing under § 966.4(n) and Subpart B — despite four written requests. And on its own
paper, the HRA decided to non-renew before it had any documented basis; the supporting
materials were assembled beginning September 20, 2022, for the September 21 board
meeting, five days after the non-renewal notice issued.
The Court should grant partial summary judgment on liability and reserve damages for
trial or for stipulation between the parties.
II. Procedural Posture
The Court’s March 6, 2025 Order on Motions to Dismiss narrowed Count I to non-
renewal claims against the HRA only, capped damages at the $3,500 figure pleaded, and
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dismissed all tort claims. (SJ 01, (Order on Motions to Dismiss, Index 96 (Mar. 6, 2025)).)
The Order is interlocutory. This motion seeks summary judgment on liability only;
damages are reserved for trial or for stipulation between the parties. 1
III. Statement Of Undisputed Facts
A.
 The Le
ase and the regulatory framework it incorporates.
1.   Plaintiff signed the Riverview Heights Lease with the HRA on December 3, 2021. (SJ
02 (Lease (Riverview Heights, commenced Dec. 5, 2021); Index 02 pp. 4–21).) The Lease
identifies the HRA as the “Authority,” identifies Riverview Heights as public housing,
and incorporates federal public-housing regulations as binding on the Landlord. (SJ 02,
(§§ 12, 16, 18, 23, 25).)
2.   The Lease attaches nine lettered documents (Attachments A through I). Attachment
B is the House Rules. (SJ 02 (Lease p. 17).) The House Rules contain twenty numbered
provisions. (SJ 03 (House Rules — Lease Attachment B; Index 02, attached to Lease).)
None of the twenty rules contains the word “harassment.” (SJ 03) None defines
“harassment.” (SJ 03) None protects “employees” or “contractors” as a category. (SJ 03)
Only Rule 4 (loud parties and noisy disturbances to “other tenants or to the community”)
and Rule 6 (criminal activity threatening “the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment
of the neighbors”) touch on conduct toward others. (SJ 03)
1. Plain tiff’s Summary Judgment Exhibits are filed concurrently herewith in two
PDF binders. Binder I contains Exhibits SJ 01–16 (factual proof documents,
including court orders, leases, HRA internal records, notices, emails, board
minutes, and discovery responses). Binder II contains Exhibits SJ 17–25
(applicable federal regulations, statutes, and legal authorities). All exhibits
are fully bookmarked for the Court’s convenience. Prior court filings are
referenced by their Index number (e.g., Index 96).
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3.   The HRA is a Public Housing Authority and Riverview Heights is public housing
within the meaning of 24 C.F .R. Part 966. The applicable federal regulation governing
termination of tenancy is 24 C.F .R. § 966.4, including (l)(2) (grounds), (l)(3) (notice
content and procedure), (m) (right to examine documents), and (n) (grievance procedure);
and 24 C.F .R. Part 966, Subpart B, §§ 966.50–966.57. (SJ 17 (24 C.F .R. § 966.4 (full text,
eCFR)); SJ 18 (24 C.F .R. Part 966, Subpart B (§§ 966.50–966.57, eCFR)).) The Lease
incorporates HUD regulations governing termination of tenancy (SJ 02 (§§ 12, 18, 23,
25)), including the parallel notice-and-grounds provisions of 24 C.F .R. Part 247 (24 C.F .R.
§§ 247.3 and 247.4), which the Court analyzed at the motion-to-dismiss stage. (SJ 19 (24
C.F .R. §§ 247.3, 247.4 (full text, eCFR)); SJ 01, (Index 96 at pp. 20–28).)
4.   The HRA’s Executive Director, Mikel B. Olson, identified 24 C.F .R. § 966.4 as the
controlling regulation in a contemporaneous internal email to Housing Manager Pamela
J. Minten dated September 19, 2022, at 2:30 p.m. The email is subject-lined “24 CFR
966.4” and contains a hyperlink to Part 966 on the eCFR. The same exhibit also contains
Plaintiff’s 7:46 a.m. September 19, 2022 email to Olson, addressed to the HRA Board,
with the attached Request for Information seeking the reasons and supporting documents
for the non-renewal. (SJ 04, (Sept. 19, 2022 7:46 a.m. Svendsen-to-Olson email and
attached Request for Information; Sept. 19, 2022 2:30 p.m. Olson-to-Minten email,
HRA 000985).) The Olson-to-Minten email was sent four days after the HRA’s initial
no-reasons notice and during the period when the HRA was assembling non-renewal
materials for the September 21, 2022 board meeting. (See ¶¶ 11–14 below.)
5.   Plaintiff pleaded § 966.4 in the operative Amended Complaint at paragraph 16 (Index
36) and briefed its application in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Index 60). Both
Part 247 and Part 966 were before the Court at the MTD stage. (SJ 01)
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B.
 The September 11–15, 20
22 renewal reversal.
6.   By letter dated August 31, 2022, the HRA invited Plaintiff to renew his Lease in the
ordinary course. A renewal appointment was scheduled for September 15, 2022. (SJ 05,
(Sept. 11–15, 2022 Renewal-Reversal Timeline; compiled from Index 02 Exs. 1–4 and
Compl. Am. Exs.).)
7.   On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff contacted the Fergus Falls Fire Department about
fire-safety records concerning the building. (SJ 05; Compl. ¶¶ 38–44.)
8.   On September 14, 2022, at approximately 1:19 p.m., Plaintiff’s renewal appointment
was rescheduled earlier — to September 15. (SJ 05)
9.   On September 15, 2022, with Executive Director Olson present, the HRA converted
the appointment from a renewal to a non-renewal and delivered an initial written notice.
(SJ 06 (Sept. 15, 2022 Initial Notice of Non-Renewal; Compl. Ex. 05; Index 02); SJ 05)
C.
 The September 15, 20
22 no-reasons initial notice.
10.  The HRA’s September 15, 2022 written notice stated that the Lease would not be
renewed but stated no factual or contractual basis. (SJ 06) The notice did not identify any
Lease section, any House Rule, any federal regulation, or any conduct. (SJ 06)
D.
 P
ost-decision reason assembly, September 20 onward; September 21 board meeting;
HUD-correspondence admission.
11.  Beginning September 20, 2022 — five days after the non-renewal decision was made
and notice was delivered — HRA staff began assembling internal memoranda, notes-to-
file, and supporting documents purporting to identify reasons for the non-renewal. At
9:56 p.m. on September 20, 2022, Housing Manager Pamela Minten emailed Executive
Director Mikel Olson under the subject line “time line,” stating: “Mikel – I have enclosed
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a copy of what I have so far – I will continue with it in the morning and then bring it over
to you – I have about had it for the day…Sorry its not done yet.” (SJ 07, (Minten-to-Olson
email, Sept. 20, 2022, 9:56 p.m., with attached “Time line from tenant in apartment #401
(Stephen Svendsen)”; HRA 000370–000376).) The attached timeline (HRA 000372–
000376) was the work product Minten was assembling that evening and continuing the
next morning. These materials, including a handwritten memorandum from a New
Dimensions employee dated September 20, 2022, were placed in Plaintiff’s tenant file and
later produced through the HRA’s outside law firm on October 11, 2022, as Compl. Am.
Ex. 47. (SJ 08, (Compl. Am. Ex. 47 (tenant-file production from CJB Law Office, Oct.
11, 2022); Index 39 p. 152 ff.); SJ 09, (Post-Decision Reason-Assembly Timeline); SJ 01,
(Index 96 (Court noting reason-assembly materials in tenant file)).)
12.  The reason-assembly materials were prepared for, and presented to, the HRA Board
of Commissioners meeting held on September 21, 2022. (SJ 10, (Sept. 21, 2022 HRA
Board Meeting Minutes; Compl. Am. Ex. 69; Index 104 at p. 15); SJ 08; SJ 09)
13.  The September 21, 2022 board minutes (SJ 10) contain multiple separate,
independent admissions material to liability:
a.  The non-renewal of Plaintiff’s Lease was not on the original agenda for the September
21, 2022 meeting. (SJ 10, (Sept. 14, 2022 Olson memo to Board with agenda enclosure;
agenda omits non-renewal).) It was added to new business by motion at the start of the
meeting. (SJ 10, (“A motion was made and seconded with ayes [to] make two additions
to the agenda under new business: 1) application for Stability Housing vouchers 2) non-
renewal of lease at Riverview Heights”).)
b.  The HRA’s board record affirmatively states that HUD told the HRA non-renewals
require good cause:
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“The Fergus Falls HRA received correspondence from Housing and Urban Development
that non-renewals need to include good cause for it to be an approved action.”
(SJ 10) In subsequent discovery, the HRA characterized that language as a “typographical
error” and, through the affidavit of Executive Director Mikel B. Olson, identified the
September 19, 2022 Olson-to-Minten email (SJ 04) as the underlying “correspondence.”
(Olson Aff. ¶ 3, Index 157.) Whether the minutes are read at face value or as the affidavit
reframes them, the HRA’s contemporaneous record establishes that the HRA knew on
September 21, 2022, that non-renewals require good cause under the controlling federal
regulation.
c.  The Board was informed that no other tenants had filed harassment complaints against
Plaintiff and that none were willing to participate as complaining witnesses: “The Board
asked if the neighboring residents have filed harassment complaints against the tenant
given the non-renewal of lease. Fellow residents do not want to participate.” (SJ 10)
d.  The Board acknowledged that Plaintiff had retained legal representation and was
contesting the non-renewal: “The Tenant has begun working with legal representation;
disagreeing with the legality of the Fergus Falls HRA not renewing the lease.” (SJ 10)
e.  The Board issued a four-point direction documenting, in its own minutes, that as of
September 21, 2022 the harassment characterization was unconfirmed, that information
requests would not be answered, and that a replacement notice would be drafted by
outside counsel after “reviewing the CFR”:
“The Board’s direction today was to: 1) Receive confirmation from J.J. Cline on whether
the actions, prior to this Recertification Appointment, conducted by this tenant of non-
renewal could be classified as harassment. 2) Not respond to any of the requests for
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information. 3) Send a letter, approved by J.J. Cline, withdrawing the non-renewal, stating
that after reviewing the CFR the Fergus Falls HRA will provide a termination of lease
upon harassment to other tenants and staff. 4) Send letter certified mail.” (SJ 10)
14.  The chronology — September 13 fire-records inquiry; September 14 appointment
moved earlier; September 15 no-reasons non-renewal notice; September 19 Olson-
to-Minten “24 CFR 966.4” email; September 20–21 reason-assembly for the board;
September 21 board minutes admission of “good cause” requirement; September 27
amended notice — is established by the HRA’s own paper and is undisputed. (SJ 04; SJ
06; SJ 11; SJ 10; SJ 08; SJ 05; SJ 09)
E.
 The September 2
7, 2022 Amended Notice — undefined “harassment” only.
15.  On September 27, 2022, the HRA issued an Amended Notice of Non-Renewal citing
“repeated harassment” of residents, HRA employees, authority contractors, and service
providers. (SJ 11, (Sept. 27, 2022 Amended Notice of Non-Renewal; Compl. Ex. 06;
Index 02).) The Amended Notice does not define “harassment,” identifies no specific
conduct, identifies no Lease provision on its face (Clause 16(12) was named only later,
in verified discovery, see ¶ 17 below), identifies no House Rule, and identifies no federal
regulation. (SJ 11) The categories of complainants the Amended Notice cites expanded
between September 21 and September 27, 2022: the September 21 board directive said
“harassment to other tenants and staff” (SJ 10), and the September 27 Amended Notice
as issued added “authority contractors” and “service providers.” (SJ 11)
F.
 F
our written requests for reasons, documents, and grievance hearing — and HRA non-
response.
16.   (SJ 12, (Plaintiff’s Four Requests for Reasons/Hearing & HRA Non-Response;
compiled from Compl. Am. Exs. 23, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 50, 51).) On September
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21, 2022, the HRA Board directed staff to “[n]ot respond to any of the requests for
information” (SJ 10) — and the HRA did not respond. No grievance hearing was
scheduled. No documents were made available for Plaintiff’s examination at HRA offices,
as § 966.4(m) requires. The documents the HRA eventually produced on October 11,
2022 were sent through its outside law firm as a paper production (SJ 08), not made
available for examination at the HRA’s offices before any hearing or trial. (SJ 12; SJ 13
(Compl. Am. Ex. 46 — Oct. 11, 2022 list of HRA documents; Index 39 p. 148).) The
Minten-to-Olson September 20, 2022 9:56 p.m. email and the timeline attached to it (SJ
07) — produced separately from the October 11, 2022 production — do not appear on the
October 11, 2022 list of HRA documents in SJ 13.
G.
 The HRA
’s verified discovery position.
17.  On April 30, 2026, the HRA served its verified answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories,
Set I. (SJ 14, (HRA’s Verified Answers to Interrogatories, Set I, served Apr. 30, 2026;
Index 204, Def. Ex. 1).) The HRA confirmed under oath that:
a.  Clause 16(12) is the only Lease provision the HRA invokes as the contractual basis for
the non-renewal. (SJ 14, (Ans. 4).)
b.  “Harassment,” as used in the September 27, 2022 Amended Notice, is given no
specialized or defined meaning; the HRA relies on the plain dictionary meaning of the
term. (SJ 14, (Ans. 5).)
18.  The HRA has not identified — in either the Amended Notice (SJ 11), its post-hoc
supporting materials (SJ 08), or its verified discovery responses (SJ 14) — any House
Rule, written policy, or prior written notice that defined “harassment” or warned Plaintiff
that any specific conduct would be grounds for termination of his Lease.
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19.  Neither the September 15, 2022 Initial Notice (SJ 06) nor the September 27, 2022
Amended Notice (SJ 11) alleges that Plaintiff engaged in criminal activity. Neither notice
identifies a criminal harassment statute, including Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (SJ 20). The
HRA did not refer the matter to law enforcement, did not seek a no-trespass order, and
did not invoke the criminal-activity carve-out at 24 C.F .R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i)(A). In its 2026
verified Interrogatory Answer 5, the HRA confirmed under oath that “harassment” as
used in the September 27 Amended Notice carries only the plain dictionary meaning, not
a criminal predicate. (SJ 14 Ans. 5.)
H.
 The HRA
’s progressive-discipline policy — applied to others, not to Plaintiff.
20.  The HRA maintains and posts on the doors of its 60 units a three-step progressive-
discipline policy for tenant lease violations (drug use, smoking, pets in hallways). (SJ
15, (Compl. Ex. 08 — HRA door-posted three-step warning notices; Index 02); SJ 16
(Plaintiff’s Declaration in Support of SJ).) Plaintiff personally observed those posted
notices during his tenancy and personally observed a Step 1 letter signed by Pamela
Minten issued to a comparator tenant for a small dog in the community room. (SJ 16 ¶¶
7–9; Compl. ¶ 86.)
21.  he HRA afforded Plaintiff no step, no warning, and no progressive-discipline process
before non-renewing the Lease. (SJ 16 ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 17.)
IV. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; DLH,
Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). The non-movant must come forward with
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; bare allegations and conclusory denials are
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insufficient. Id. at 71. To defend the non-renewal here, the HRA must come forward with
specific evidence on every regulatory element it must satisfy under 24 C.F .R. § 966.4.
V. Argument
A.
 24 C.F
.R. Part 966 governs this non-renewal — as the HRA’s own Executive Director
admitted in writing, and as the HRA’s own board minutes admit by reference to a “good
cause” requirement.
The threshold legal question — which regulation governs — is established as undisputed
fact by the HRA’s own contemporaneous admissions.
First, on September 19, 2022, at 2:30 p.m., Director Olson sent an internal email to
Housing Manager Minten subject-lined “24 CFR 966.4,” containing a hyperlink to Part
966 on the eCFR. (SJ 04) That email is a statement of a party-opponent under Minn.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2). It establishes, as a matter of undisputed fact, that the HRA’s top
decision-maker identified Part 966 as the governing federal regulation while the non-
renewal materials were being assembled for the September 21 board meeting. The HRA
cannot now disclaim Part 966.
Second, the HRA’s September 21, 2022 board minutes recite that the HRA “received
correspondence from Housing and Urban Development that non-renewals need to
include good cause for it to be an approved action.” (SJ 10) The HRA later tried to recast
the board-minutes language as a “typographical error,” but Olson’s affidavit confirms
that the September 19, 2022 Olson-to-Minten email identifying 24 C.F .R. § 966.4 was the
underlying “correspondence” the HRA was discussing. (Olson Aff. ¶ 3, Index 157; SJ 04.)
Either reading is fatal to the HRA’s defense. Under the minutes’ plain language, HUD
itself informed the HRA that “good cause” was required. Under the HRA’s own affidavit,
Director Olson informed the board by reference to § 966.4 that “good cause” was
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required. Both readings establish, by party admission, that the HRA knew on September
21, 2022, that non-renewals require good cause under the controlling federal regulation —
six days before it issued the September 27 amended notice.
Third, the Lease independently confirms the result: Riverview Heights is public housing;
the HRA is a Public Housing Authority; the Lease incorporates federal regulations
governing termination of tenancy. (SJ 02, (§§ 12, 18, 23, 25).) The Court’s March 6, 2025
Order analyzed the parallel notice-and-grounds requirements of 24 C.F .R. Part 247. (SJ
01, (Index 96 at pp. 20–28).) The MTD ruling is interlocutory and the Part 966 / Part 247
question was not contested or decided there. In any event, the result is the same under
either Part because the Lease independently requires compliance with HUD regulations,
and the HRA’s notice and process violated both regulatory regimes.
The Part 966 framework is therefore established by the Lease, the public-housing
character of the tenancy, and the HRA’s own contemporaneous records. Argument A
proceeds on that foundation.
B.
 The HRA cannot est
ablish “serious or repeated violation of material terms of the Lease”
under 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(i).
Under § 966.4(l)(2)(i), the HRA may non-renew only for “serious or repeated violation of
material terms of the lease.” The HRA cannot meet that burden as a matter of law on this
record.
1.  The HRA has, by verified discovery, narrowed the universe to Clause 16(12) and
dictionary “harassment.”
In its verified discovery responses, the HRA has locked itself, under oath, to a single
contractual hook and a single source of meaning. The contractual hook is Lease Clause
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16(12). (SJ 14, (Ans. 4).) The source of meaning is the plain dictionary definition of
“harassment.” (SJ 14, (Ans. 5).) That is the universe of the HRA’s defense. The Court
may decide this motion on that universe alone.
2.  Clause 16(12) cannot reach Plaintiff’s conduct.
Clause 16(12) prohibits conduct that “may threaten the health, safety or right to peaceful
enjoyment” of others. (SJ 02, (§ 16).) Good-faith tenant complaints to management, and
tenant inquiries to the Fergus Falls Fire Department about building fire-safety records,
do not threaten anyone’s health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment. No reasonable factfinder
could conclude otherwise on this record.
3.  Every definitional source the HRA has put in play forecloses its theory in two
independent layers — illegality and absence of legitimate purpose.
The HRA relies on the plain dictionary meaning of “harassment.” (SJ 14, (Ans. 5).) Every
authoritative source the HRA has invoked or that is available defines harassment in terms
that exclude Plaintiff’s conduct in two independent ways.
First — illegality. The Cambridge Dictionary defines harassment in its legal sense as
“illegal behaviour towards a person that causes mental or emotional suffering, which
includes repeated unwanted contacts without a reasonable purpose, insults, threats,
touching, or offensive language.” (SJ 21, (Cambridge Dictionary, “harassment” (LAW
sense)).) That definition has a threshold element: the conduct must be illegal. The HRA
has never alleged that any of Plaintiff’s conduct was illegal. Neither the September 15 nor
September 27, 2022 notice referenced any criminal harassment statute. (SJ 06; SJ 11) The
HRA made no referral to law enforcement, sought no charge under Minn. Stat. § 609.749
(SJ 20), and in its 2026 verified Ans. 5 disclaimed any criminal predicate, relying on plain
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dictionary meaning. (SJ 14) On the threshold element of the dictionary the HRA itself put
in play, Plaintiff’s conduct does not qualify.
Second — absence of legitimate purpose. Each definitional source independently requires
the absence of a legitimate purpose. Black’s Law Dictionary defines harassment, citing the
federal statute, as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial
emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” (SJ 22, (Black’s
Law Dictionary 6th ed. p. 717; quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1)).) The Model Penal Code
definition Black’s reproduces similarly requires conduct “serving no legitimate purpose
of the actor.” (SJ 22, (Model Penal Code § 250.4).) Cambridge requires conduct “without
a reasonable purpose.” (SJ 21) Minnesota’s criminal harassment statute requires intent
to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, and expressly excludes conduct authorized, required,
or protected by law or by the state, federal, or tribal constitutions. (SJ 20, (Minn. Stat. §
609.749, subds. 2, 7).)
Plaintiff’s conduct on this record was legitimate-purpose conduct as a matter of law.
Good-faith tenant complaints to management are expressly authorized by Lease §§ 22 and
23. (SJ 02) An inquiry to the Fergus Falls Fire Department about fire-safety records is a
constitutionally protected petition to a government body and is expressly protected from
harassment liability by Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 7. (SJ 20) No reasonable factfinder
could conclude on this record that those activities were “without a reasonable purpose,”
“served no legitimate purpose,” or were undertaken with “purpose to harass.” The
HRA’s dictionary-meaning theory therefore fails as a matter of law on the second layer
as well. The timeline the HRA itself assembled and attached to SJ 07 confirms the point
on the HRA’s own paper: it documents years of Plaintiff’s complaints to management
— about dog barking, items in common areas, contractor noise, security concerns, and
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unattended medical alarms — and documents Minten responding to those complaints
with information, ordinance copies, and remedial action. (SJ 07, (HRA 000372–
000376).) The HRA treated this exact category of communication as legitimate tenant
correspondence for years, until Plaintiff’s September 13, 2022 fire-records inquiry. Only
then did the same category of conduct become “harassment.”
4.  The House Rules — Attachment B to the Lease — contain no “harassment” rule and
do not reach Plaintiff’s conduct.
The HRA’s verified Interrogatory Answer 4 invokes only Clause 16(12). (SJ 14) The
Court in Index 96 observed that no house rules had been put before it and that “the
records and briefing do not allow the Court to identify a specific term of the rental
agreement” violated by Plaintiff’s conduct. (SJ 01, (Index 96 at p. 27).) Discovery has now
cured the absence — and confirms the gap. The House Rules (Lease Attachment B) are
before this Court at SJ 03. They contain twenty numbered provisions. None contains the
word “harassment.” (SJ 03) None defines “harassment.” (SJ 03) None protects “HRA
employees” or “authority contractors” — the categories the September 27 Amended
Notice invokes. (SJ 03) The only rules touching on conduct toward others are Rule 4
(loud parties and noisy disturbances) and Rule 6 (criminal activity threatening neighbors).
(SJ 03) Neither reaches good-faith complaints to management or inquiries to the Fire
Department.
The result is decisive: the HRA cannot rescue its non-renewal with a house-rule theory
because (a) by verified discovery, it does not invoke one (SJ 14), and (b) even if it tried, the
House Rules contain no rule reaching Plaintiff’s conduct (SJ 03).
5.  The HRA cannot establish material noncompliance because, on its own paper, the non-
renewal decision preceded any documented basis.
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This is the single fact that disposes of the § 966.4(l)(2)(i) defense most cleanly. As of
September 13, 2022, the HRA was prepared to renew the Lease in the ordinary course:
it had sent a routine renewal letter and scheduled a renewal appointment. (SJ 05) The
non-renewal decision was made by September 14–15, 2022, when the appointment
was reversed and the no-reasons notice delivered. (SJ 06; SJ 05) The supporting
documentation — the memos, notes-to-file, and internal emails purporting to justify
the non-renewal — was assembled beginning September 20, 2022, for the September
21 board meeting, and was not finalized and produced until October 11, 2022. (SJ 10; SJ
08; SJ 09) The Court in Index 96 itself noted the September 20, 2022 handwritten New
Dimensions memorandum in Plaintiff’s tenant file — a same-day note generated during
the same post-decision period when Minten was preparing the non-renewal “time line”
materials for Olson and the Board. (SJ 01, (Index 96 at pp. 13, 16–17); SJ 07; SJ 09.)
Two contemporaneous HRA admissions confirm that the supporting record was
constructed after the September 15 decision, not before it. On the evening of September
20, 2022, at 9:56 p.m., Housing Manager Minten emailed Director Olson under the
subject line “time line”: “Mikel – I have enclosed a copy of what I have so far – I will
continue with it in the morning and then bring it over to you – I have about had it for
the day…Sorry its not done yet.” (SJ 07) That email is a statement of a party-opponent
under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The work product Minten attached and would continue
assembling the next morning was the reason-supporting timeline (HRA 000372–000376)
for Plaintiff’s tenant file. Minten herself confirms, in her own words, that the timeline
was not complete on September 20, 2022 — five days after the September 15 no-reasons
notice.
The second admission appears in the September 21, 2022 board minutes. The Board
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directed J.J. Cline, the HRA’s outside counsel, to “[r]eceive confirmation… on whether
the actions, prior to this Recertification Appointment, conducted by this tenant of non-
renewal could be classified as harassment.” (SJ 10) The Board, on September 21, 2022
— six days after the no-reasons notice and six days before the September 27 Amended
Notice characterizing Plaintiff’s conduct as “repeated harassment” — did not yet know
whether the conduct “could be classified as harassment.” The legal characterization was
being shopped to counsel after the non-renewal decision was made. That is a textbook
party admission that the harassment theory was constructed, not justified.
“Material noncompliance” sufficient to terminate a public-housing tenancy under §
966.4(l)(2)(i) must exist and motivate the termination decision at the time it is made. A
PHA cannot decide first and document second. The HRA’s own paper trail shows it did
exactly that. The September 19 Olson-to-Minten “24 CFR 966.4” email crystallizes the
point on the regulatory side: as of September 19, four days after the no-reasons notice, the
Executive Director was emailing his Housing Manager about the controlling regulation
— confirming that the regulatory hook was being identified after-the-fact. (SJ 04) The
September 20 Minten “Sorry its not done yet” email confirms it on the factual side. The
September 21 board direction to counsel confirms it on the legal-characterization side.
That is not “for cause.” That is constructed cause.
6.  If the HRA had actually believed Plaintiff’s conduct constituted “serious or repeated
violation of material terms of the Lease,” its own published procedures would have
produced a documented Step 1 warning.
The HRA maintains and posts on its doors a three-step progressive-discipline policy for
lease violations. (SJ 15; SJ 16) Pamela Minten signed a Step 1 letter to a comparator tenant
for a small dog in the community room. (SJ 16; Compl. ¶ 86.) The HRA afforded Plaintiff
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no step, no warning, no process. (SJ 16; Compl. ¶ 17.) If the HRA had actually believed
Plaintiff’s conduct constituted “serious or repeated violation of material terms of the
Lease,” its own published procedures would have produced a documented Step 1 warning.
There is none. Its own conduct contradicts the position it now asserts.
C.  The HRA cannot establish “other good cause” because (i) Part 247 expressly forbids
it absent prior written notice the HRA never gave, and (ii) Part 966 requires “specific
grounds” the notices never stated.
If the HRA were to retreat from the Clause 16(12) / “material noncompliance” defense
and assert “other good cause” — the catch-all hook at 24 C.F .R. § 966.4(l)(2)(iv) — the
defense fails as a matter of law on two independent regulatory grounds, each rooted in the
text of HUD regulations the Lease incorporates.
First, Part 247 expressly forbids it. The Lease incorporates HUD regulations governing
termination of tenancy. (SJ 02, (Lease §§ 12, 18, 23, 25).) 24 C.F .R. Part 247, governing
evictions from federally subsidized projects, contains the controlling express prior-notice
rule for “other good cause” non-renewal:
“The conduct of a tenant cannot be deemed other good cause under § 247.3(a)(4) unless
the landlord has given the tenant prior notice that said conduct shall henceforth constitute
a basis for termination of occupancy.”
24 C.F .R. § 247.3(b). (SJ 19) The rule is not implicit; it is the text of the regulation. The
record contains no such prior notice. The HRA has identified none in discovery. (SJ
14) The Court’s March 6, 2025 Order already analyzed Part 247 at the MTD stage as
applicable to this tenancy. (SJ 01, (Index 96 at pp. 20–28).) Section 247.3(b) is therefore
both incorporated by the Lease and previously treated as applicable by this Court — and
its plain text forecloses the HRA’s “other good cause” defense.
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Second, Part 966 requires the same result. Section 966.4(l)(3)(ii) requires the termination
notice to “state specific grounds for termination.” Neither the September 15, 2022 no-
reasons notice (SJ 06) nor the September 27, 2022 “repeated harassment” notice (SJ
11) identifies specific grounds in the form Part 966 requires. The Lease itself echoes the
same standard at § 18, requiring notice with “enough detail for the Resident to prepare a
defense” — language traceable directly to 24 C.F .R. § 247.4(a)(2) (“enough specificity so
as to enable the tenant to prepare a defense”). (SJ 19) The notices fail under Part 966, fail
under Part 247, and fail under Lease § 18.
Third, on the face of the (l)(2)(iv) categories themselves, the HRA cannot match its
theory to the regulation. The (l)(2)(iv) examples include criminal activity, alcohol abuse,
ineligibility-after-admission, material false statements or fraud, service-requirement
failure, and refusal to accept a lease revision. The HRA has identified none of those. By
verified discovery, its theory is undefined dictionary “harassment” (SJ 14 (Ans. 5)) — not
criminal harassment, not fraud, not ineligibility, not service-requirement failure, not lease-
revision refusal. The (l)(2)(iv) hook is unavailable on its face.
The HRA’s own conduct through September 13, 2022 — the routine renewal letter
and pre-approved renewal appointment (SJ 05) — is an admission, by conduct, that no
terminable conduct then existed. A landlord that on September 13 invites a tenant to
renew cannot, on September 15, terminate for “other good cause” without first giving the
prior written notice § 247.3(b) requires and identifying the specific grounds § 966.4(l)(3)
(ii) requires. That did not happen here.
D.  The HRA breached 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3), (m), and (n) plus Subpart B — every notice-
and-procedure requirement it knew applied.
The procedural breaches are independent of the substantive grounds. Even if the HRA
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could show “material noncompliance” or “other good cause” — and it cannot — its
notice and process violated three subsections of § 966.4 and all of Subpart B.
1.  § 966.4(l)(3) — notice content.
The September 15, 2022 initial notice stated no grounds at all. (SJ 06) The September 27,
2022 amended notice cited only undefined “harassment” — failing both the regulatory
specificity requirement and Lease § 18’s “enough detail to prepare a defense” standard.
(SJ 11; SJ 02 (§ 18).)
2.  § 966.4(m) — document examination.
§ 966.4(m) requires the PHA, upon the tenant’s request, to provide a reasonable
opportunity to examine documents directly relevant to the termination before a PHA
grievance hearing or court trial. The regulation contains an eviction-bar consequence:
“if the PHA does not make the documents available for examination upon request by the
tenant, the PHA may not proceed with the eviction.” Plaintiff requested those documents
on October 3, 2022. (SJ 12) The HRA did not make them available at its offices. The
documents that came on October 11, 2022 came through outside counsel as a paper
production (SJ 08), not as the examination the regulation requires. (SJ 13, (Oct. 11 list
confirming production “via third party”).)
3.  § 966.4(n) and Subpart B — grievance hearing.
§ 966.4(n) and Part 966, Subpart B (§§ 966.50–966.57) require the PHA to provide a
grievance hearing for a tenant who disputes a PHA action adversely affecting the tenant’s
rights. (SJ 18) Plaintiff requested a grievance hearing on October 3, 2022, and again
on October 10, 2022. (SJ 12) No hearing was held. The HRA’s non-response was not
inadvertent — it was directed by board vote. On September 21, 2022, the HRA Board
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of Commissioners adopted a directive that staff “[n]ot respond to any of the request
for information.” (SJ 10) That directive is itself a statement of a party-opponent under
Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The board voted, in writing, to violate § 966.4(m)’s document-
examination requirement and § 966.4(l)(3)(ii)’s requirement that the notice inform the
tenant of the right to request a grievance hearing.
No exception under § 966.51(a)(2) applies. The narrow Subpart B carve-out at § 966.51(a)
(2)(i) excludes from the grievance procedure only terminations involving (A) criminal
activity threatening the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of other residents
or PHA employees; (B) violent or drug-related criminal activity; or (C) criminal activity
resulting in felony conviction — and even then only when HUD has issued a due-process
determination for the jurisdiction’s eviction procedure. The HRA did not invoke that
carve-out in 2022 and cannot invoke it now. Nor did either notice contain the statements
required by § 966.4(l)(3)(v) when a PHA excludes a termination from the grievance
procedure.
At the time, the HRA was positioned to allege criminal harassment under Minn. Stat. §
609.749 (SJ 20). Had the HRA characterized Plaintiff’s conduct as criminal harassment
threatening health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment, it would have been positioned to invoke
§ 966.51(a)(2)(i)(A) and deny Plaintiff a grievance hearing on that basis. It did not do so.
The September 15 and September 27, 2022 notices alleged no criminal activity, identified
no criminal harassment statute, and pursued no police, prosecutorial, or no-trespass
process. The HRA routed the matter through the ordinary non-renewal channel, not the
criminal-activity carve-out — which means Subpart B applied in full.
The HRA’s 2026 verified discovery position locks the result. In Interrogatory Answer
5, the HRA confirmed under oath that “harassment” as used in the Amended Notice
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carries only the plain dictionary meaning — not criminal harassment under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.749 or any other criminal predicate. (SJ 14, (Ans. 5).) The HRA cannot now reach
back and claim it could have invoked a criminal-activity carve-out it neither asserted
contemporaneously nor preserved in its verified discovery position. The grievance hearing
was required, and the HRA’s failure to provide one is an independent breach of § 966.4(n)
and Subpart B.
4.  Lease § 18 — independent contractual breach.
Lease § 18 binds the HRA to “rely solely on the grounds stated in the Notice of Lease
Termination” and requires the notice to “state the grounds for termination with enough
detail for the Resident to prepare a defense.” (SJ 02, (§ 18).) A no-reasons notice followed
by an undefined- ”harassment” notice fails § 18 on its own terms, independent of the
federal regulations.
The HRA’s contemporaneous regulatory awareness aggravates each of these breaches
and forecloses any “good-faith mistake” defense. The September 21, 2022 board minutes
establish four matters by party admission: (a) the HRA had received correspondence
from HUD that non-renewals require good cause (SJ 10); (b) the HRA knew Plaintiff
had retained counsel and was contesting the non-renewal (SJ 10); (c) the harassment
characterization was unconfirmed as of September 21 and was being shopped to outside
counsel for confirmation (SJ 10); and (d) the Board affirmatively directed staff to “[n]ot
respond to any of the request for information” (SJ 10). The Olson-to-Minten “24 CFR
966.4” email two days earlier confirms the HRA was reviewing the controlling regulation
in the same window. (SJ 04) The HRA therefore knew, on September 21, 2022, that (1)
good cause was required, (2) it did not yet know whether its harassment characterization
would hold, (3) the tenant was litigating, and (4) the regulations required document
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examination and a grievance hearing. With that knowledge, the Board voted to refuse
the information requests § 966.4(m) requires and proceeded to issue the September 27
Amended Notice without scheduling the grievance hearing § 966.4(n) requires. That
is not regulatory oversight. That is a board-level decision to violate the regulations the
HRA’s own Executive Director had identified six days earlier.
E.  The Parkin / Hill v. Primeaux timing and pretext analysis confirms the breach.
Plaintiff does not invoke Parkin as an independent retaliation claim here, but as Minnesota
timing-and-pretext authority confirming the absence of contemporaneous good cause.
Minnesota authority is consistent with the regulatory analysis. In Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240
N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a landlord asserting a
nonretaliatory reason for non-renewal must show the reason was “wholly unrelated to and
unmotivated by” the tenant’s protected activity. (SJ 23, (Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d
828 (Minn. 1976)).) Implicit and necessary to that test is that the asserted reason existed
at the time of the non-renewal decision — not constructed afterward.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied Parkin in Hill v. Primeaux, A19-2058 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2020) (Segal, C.J.) (unpublished), on a September 15/16 reversal
timeline materially identical to the one here. (SJ 24, (Hill v. Primeaux, A19-2058
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2020)).) And in Central Housing Associates, LP v. Olson, 929
N.W.2d 398 (2019), the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that tenant complaints
to government bodies are protected activity. (SJ 25, (Central Housing Associates, LP v.
Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398 (2019).)
On this record — September 13 fire-records inquiry; September 14 appointment moved
earlier; September 15 renewal-to-non-renewal flip; September 19 Olson email identifying
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§ 966.4; September 20 onward reason-assembly for the September 21 board meeting;
September 21 board minutes admission of a good-cause requirement — the HRA cannot
establish that its stated reason for non-renewal was “wholly unrelated to and unmotivated
by” Plaintiff’s protected reporting. The same record that defeats the § 966.4(l)(2)
defense also confirms, under Parkin’s timing-and-pretext analysis, the absence of
contemporaneous good cause.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court should grant Plaintiff partial summary judgment
establishing the Fergus Falls HRA’s liability for breach of contract on Count I, with
damages reserved for trial or, in the alternative, for stipulation between the parties.
Dated May 22, 2026
By /s/Stephen R. Svendsen
Stephen Roy Svendsen, Plaintiff pro se
540 E 100 N Apt 307
Moab UT 84532
stephenroysvendsen@icloud.com
612 840-7301
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