Introduction
Justice-Denied grew out of what Marie and I experienced as litigants. We knew what we had submitted, what we had asked the court to decide, and how its decisions affected our lives. When I began using artificial intelligence to examine the orders and transcripts, the analyses repeatedly identified concerns that matched what we had experienced firsthand. They helped me organize the record, describe those concerns, and develop the work that became this publication.
Those early analyses belong in that history. Reading a ruling years later is different from living through the requests, objections, delays, and consequences that produced it. Our experience gives the documents context. The documents, in turn, allow readers to examine the basis for our criticism.
Further research has also changed parts of my understanding. Some early explanations overstated a legal rule or treated different provisions in two orders as though they represented equivalent contested decisions. Those points deserve a clear account alongside the conclusions I continue to hold.
The amendment issue: futility and disputed facts
Our early amendment analyses criticized Judge Kevin M. Miller for using a summary-judgment test when deciding whether we could add allegations to our complaint. That criticism was too broad. Minnesota Rule 15.01 favors allowing amendments when justice requires, but courts may reject a proposed claim that could not survive summary judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly recognized that authority in Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., PDF pages 37–38.
The distinction is between testing whether a claim can proceed and deciding genuinely disputed facts against the person bringing it. Correcting the first point brings the second into sharper focus.
One proposed allegation concerned a statement that I had secretly added my name to Renee Stevenson’s insurance. I submitted a sworn declaration describing how my father sought her authorization and how she separately arranged to add my name to another policy. I expressly denied having my name added without her knowledge or consent. That account appears in Doc. 136, pages 2–4, particularly paragraphs 41–43.
Miller’s December 15, 2021 order treated the challenged statements as substantially true and said we had supplied no evidence supporting a reasonable interpretation of falsity. Its substantial-truth discussion did not address the declaration’s contrary account of consent. Doc. 152, pages 9–10.
I knew that account because I had lived it. I had also put it before the court under penalty of perjury. An order announcing substantial truth without addressing that sworn account remains a serious concern to me. The correction concerns the court’s authority to conduct futility review. My continuing criticism concerns how the order handled the evidence during that review.
The partial grant also needs to be described accurately. Miller allowed Ashley Anderson’s addition as a defendant and the civil-conspiracy claim while striking targeted allegations. Allowing an unopposed new defendant while rejecting disputed allegations does not, standing alone, establish inconsistent standards. The reasons for excluding the disputed allegations require examination.
Miller’s own explanation in a later case
The later Christiansen Keefe v. Kronemann Construction record supplies a concrete comparison. In his March 28, 2025 order allowing Keefe to seek punitive damages, Miller explained that he could consider the whole record while crediting the plaintiff’s evidence, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, and refraining from weighing conflicting evidence for credibility. Keefe Doc. 61, pages 12–14.
He applied that approach to an inference that a foreman had implicitly approved an employee’s dangerous conduct. Miller recognized that the inference was contestable but concluded that a jury could reasonably draw it. He left the probable consequences for jurors to assess. Doc. 61, pages 19–20.
Keefe involved statutory permission to plead punitive damages; our motion involved proposed defamation allegations. The comparison concerns the treatment of evidence and reasonable inferences. Miller explained why Keefe’s contestable inference survived. His amendment order in our case did not explain how my sworn account of consent fit its conclusion about substantial truth.
That is the more precise criticism developed in our later amendment article and When Judge Miller Left Disputed Facts to a Jury. Further research strengthened the comparison by identifying the evidence and the standard that mattered.
The IME comparison: contested rulings and agreed terms
The early comparison of the two cases’ independent medical examinations also needed refinement. An independent medical examination, or IME, is an examination sought by the opposing party in litigation. The conditions determine what the person being examined can preserve and how the examination will occur.
In Keefe, Miller permitted recording of a psychological examination over the defense’s objection. Other provisions came from agreements: reimbursement of reasonable travel expenses, recording three other examinations, the expert-report deadline, and a waiver of objections to Keefe calling unused defense examiners. The order expressly distinguished those agreements from the remaining disputes. Keefe Doc. 43, pages 2–5; read pages 3–6.
Those agreed terms should not be counted as separate contested rulings demonstrating different judicial standards. The orders also do not establish matching disputes about third-party attendance or forms. Keefe’s advance disclosure of forms allowed his attorney to review them and prepare objections; it was not an unrestricted right to veto the examination’s paperwork.
The recording comparison remains. Miller allowed Keefe to record the disputed psychological examination, relying on Minnesota’s recording statute and his authority to set examination conditions under Rule 35.01. In our case, he ordered: “There shall be no recording of Marie’s IME.” Stevenson Doc. 205, page 7.
That order summarized the competing recording arguments before imposing the prohibition. It did not separately explain why our recording argument failed. Its summary also recited our prior agreement that I would not attend. The order denied the defense’s requests to exclude our experts and recover attorney fees and costs. Doc. 205, page 2 (expert exclusion) and page 7 (experts, fees, and costs). These details belong in the account.
I continue to question the different recording outcomes. Marie and I experienced the examination requirements and the loss of an objective recording as real consequences. Removing comparisons based on agreements leaves a focused question: why was recording permitted over objection in Keefe’s psychological examination after being prohibited in Marie’s?
A note on the order’s dates. We referred to Doc. 205 as the April 18, 2022 order because April 18 is the date shown in MCRO and the date it became available there. The order itself is signed and court-file-stamped April 15. Both dates refer to the same order in MCRO, case 56-CV-20-2928, Index #205.
What the original ratings and dates tell readers
Corrections to the amendment and IME analyses were published on October 19, 2026. They addressed the legal premise about futility and the distinction between contested IME decisions and agreed terms. The related pages retained their original ratings: −9 for the amendment analysis, −7 for the IME comparison, and −6 for the December 15, 2021 order assessment.
The Bias Explorer now contains 20 assessments covering 19 distinct orders. Nineteen ratings fall on the defendant-favoring side and one on the plaintiff-favoring side. Those numbers summarize the retained assessments. Keeping them preserves what the analyses concluded at the time; later reporting explains how particular reasons have developed.
The available publication records also distinguish the stages of this work. The related amendment and IME pages were published March 16, 2025. The 19 older Explorer assessments were published April 11–13, 2025, and identify ChatGPT 4o. The August 2026 order assessment was published August 18, 2026, and identifies GPT-5. These are publication dates. The pages do not supply exact generation dates for the original AI responses.
My judgment about our treatment in court comes from the record together with what we experienced. Further research has led me to narrow some arguments, identify stronger comparisons, and describe particular rulings more accurately. The original analyses remain important to understanding how this work began. The later reporting shows where that work has led.
Our criticism is strongest when readers can see the request, the evidence, the ruling, and the reason we object. That is the account I intend Justice-Denied to preserve and continue developing.
Primary records
- Stevenson v. Stevenson, No. 56-CV-20-2928: Doc. 136, declaration filed October 1, 2021, pages 2–4; Doc. 152, December 15, 2021 amendment order, pages 8–11; Doc. 205, IME order signed and filed April 15, 2022, listed in MCRO under April 18, pages 1–2 and 4–7. Public copies and excerpts are linked above. For complete filings, search the case number and Index number in Minnesota Court Records Online.
- Christiansen Keefe v. Kronemann Construction, Inc., No. 56-CV-23-1802: Doc. 43, October 18, 2024 IME order, pages 2–6; Doc. 61, March 28, 2025 punitive-damages amendment order, pages 12–14 and 19–20.
- Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 714 (Minn. 2012), official PDF pages 37–38; Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01; Rule 35.01.
