Two Cases, One Pattern of Narrowing? Comparing Stevenson and Svendsen

Introduction

Stevenson and Svendsen arose from different disputes but followed a similar procedural path before Judge Kevin M. Miller. Stevenson v. Stevenson, Court File No. 56-CV-20-2928, involved defamation, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and conspiracy claims arising from an intra-family conflict. Svendsen v. Fergus Falls HRA, Court File No. 56-CV-24-1426, concerns a former tenant’s claims against the Fergus Falls Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA), the City of Fergus Falls, and public officials.

In both cases, successive rulings narrowed the claims and restricted discovery before summary judgment ended the action without trial. The written reasons raise a common question: did the court address the motions, evidence, and explanations actually presented?

Disputed liability, dismissal on damages

On September 18, 2026, Miller decided the motions argued on June 22. His order at MCRO Index 292 denied Steve Svendsen’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability and his request to revise the March 6, 2025 interlocutory order. It granted the HRA defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

An interlocutory order is an interim ruling, not the final resolution of a case. The March order dismissed some claims but left the lease claim pending. Under Rule 54.02, the court could revise that order before final judgment.

The court found genuine issues of material fact concerning liability under the lease and rejected the HRA’s argument that the alleged lease violations entitled it to judgment as a matter of law. It nevertheless ended the surviving contract claim because, it concluded, Svendsen had failed to establish damages.

Two gaps in the written reasons stand out: the treatment of supplemented expense records and the response to Svendsen’s request to revise the earlier order. The discovery rulings show how the case reached that point.

Stevenson and Svendsen at a glance

Two gaps in the September order

Acknowledged expense records, unexplained treatment

The HRA’s September 16 brief acknowledged documentation for $1,934.20 in U-Haul, lodging, and fuel expenses. The accompanying declaration identified June 1 as the date of the supplemental disclosures and stated that the documents accompanied them. Two days later, the September order said Svendsen had provided no support for his claimed damages, relying on earlier discovery responses without addressing that supplementation.

Sources: HRA motion-in-limine brief, MCRO Index 286, pp. 1, 4, and 6; Jack M. Buck declaration, MCRO Index 287, p. 1; September 18 order, MCRO Index 292, pp. 6–7.

At the June hearing, HRA attorney Buck argued that Svendsen had provided no itemization or documentation supporting the relocation expenses. Svendsen responded:

“Plaintiff supplemented his initial disclosures weeks ago, and provided a U-Haul receipt for the cost”

Svendsen — June 22 transcript, p. 31:6–7

He also identified fuel charges and a motel record. Miller invited further responses; Buck declined.

Source: June 22, 2026 transcript, pp. 29:8–30:14 and 31:4–25.

Producing documents to an opponent is distinct from properly presenting them for summary judgment under Rule 56.03. The order does not explain whether the supplemented records were outside the summary-judgment submissions or reconcile its no-support conclusion with the HRA’s filed acknowledgment.

Revision authority raised, but not analyzed

At the June hearing, Svendsen identified Rule 54.02 as the court’s authority to revise the interlocutory order:

“Rule 54.02 therefore supplies the Court’s authority to revise the order.”

Svendsen — June 22 transcript, p. 10:6–7

He identified Rule 60.02(b) and (c) as his proposed substantive framework for revising the March 6 order based on newly discovered evidence and adverse-party misconduct.

Source: June 22, 2026 transcript, pp. 9:13–10:16.

The September order’s operative paragraph acknowledges the request under Rule 60.02 “applied through” Rule 54.02. Its memorandum then denies relief because Rule 60.02 applies to final orders and the March order was interlocutory. It does not separately analyze Rule 54.02—the revision authority Svendsen expressly invoked.

Source: September 18 order, MCRO Index 292, p. 1 and pp. 7–8.

Discovery before summary judgment

On December 9, 2024, Miller stayed discovery by both sides while the dismissal motions were under advisement. The March 6, 2025 order reopened discovery on the surviving lease claim, including nonrenewal and related actions.

At the May 22, 2026 hearing, Miller told the parties:

“But until I do issue that order, I’m not going to require Mr. Olson or HRA, or anyone, to respond to any of the contested discovery requests until that order issues.”

Judge Kevin M. Miller — May 22 transcript, p. 12:6–9

The June 22 summary-judgment hearing therefore occurred while responses to the contested requests were suspended. The written protective order followed on August 19.

Sources: December 9, 2024 transcript, p. 25:20–24; May 22, 2026 transcript, p. 12:3–9, 18–23; March 6 order, pp. 28 and 51.

The suspended admissions concerned the HRA’s liability evidence and discovery history; the expense records were Svendsen’s own documents. The sequence establishes that contested discovery remained suspended at the summary-judgment hearing, not that the suspension caused the damages deficiency identified by the court.

Three recurring issues in the written reasons

How the court justified discovery limits

Both cases involved hundreds of requests for admission (RFAs). Rule 36 sets no numerical ceiling. The burden depends on the requests’ purpose, relevance, duplication, and the work required to answer them—not the count alone.

In Stevenson, the written order emphasized the original 542 RFAs and imposed a limit of 150—50 per defendant—even though 486 remained after withdrawals. In Svendsen, the HRA challenged more than 300 admissions across Sets III, IV, and V. The August memorandum moved from that total to Set V’s stated purpose without keeping the sets and their purposes distinct.

Svendsen’s written response distinguished requests about defense-produced documents from Set V’s requests about the discovery timeline. At the May hearing, he explained that admissions were an affordable alternative to depositions and sought to clarify whether events described in the defense’s own materials amounted to lease violations. The August memorandum does not discuss that explanation.

Sources: May 22, 2026 transcript, pp. 8:24–9:4 and 10:15–23; Svendsen’s May 1 response, pp. 5–6.

Characterizations before the merits decision

The Stevenson discovery order did more than deny the requested relief. It characterized the plaintiffs’ description of discovery as “lacking in candor,” labeled the effort a “fishing expedition,” found the defendants had acted in good faith, and warned that further requests for privileged or “fictional” information could produce sanctions.

In Svendsen, the March 2025 order praised the defendants’ “great patience and forbearance.” The August 2026 discovery order treated an explanatory RFA passage as an admission against Svendsen while omitting the sentence that immediately explained it.

The hearings gave both sides an opportunity to argue, but the transcripts add no judicial explanation for these characterizations or the omitted sentence. The question is how those assessments related to the court’s later decisions about discovery and evidence.

Orders that did not match the issues presented

The Svendsen August 19 order illustrates four mismatches between the issues presented and the written analysis:

• A request to stay enforcement was analyzed as a motion for reconsideration.
• Requests for admission were called interrogatories.
• The disputed email was evaluated by reference to Svendsen’s possession at the hearing rather than the alleged prejudice during briefing.
• A quotation omitted the next sentence explaining the requests’ discovery-timeline purpose.

The Stevenson record raises similar questions about the treatment of evidence, quotations, and legal issues. The comparison turns on the effect of those discrepancies on discovery and the final decisions—not merely their number.

The jury-trial record in context

A Justice-Denied review of MCRO civil hearing entries attributed to Miller from May 7, 2018, through August 31, 2026 found 43 distinct cases with at least one scheduled hearing labeled “Jury Trial.” The count tracks hearing settings, not every civil filing or jury demand.

Only one—the Becker/Drewes personal-injury action—was marked as a jury trial held before Miller, on April 23–25, 2019. The verdict addressed damages only, not contested liability. Filed March 12, 2018, it was assigned to Judge Waldemar Senyk on March 13 and reassigned to Miller on April 24. The Minnesota Judicial Branch identified Miller as Senyk’s replacement in its 2018 Annual Report (p. 39) and lists his appointment date as May 7, 2018. The only held civil jury trial located in the search was therefore inherited from his immediate predecessor.

Twenty-five cases had at least one jury setting marked “Cancelled; Settled.” Ten cases had a setting marked “Cancelled; Dismissed,” with each docket recording a stipulation connected to the disposition. Because some cases had multiple settings, these categories overlap. Those entries reflect settlements and stipulated dispositions, not ten additional merits dismissals by Miller. Other settings involved continuances or cancellations, summary judgment, another route to judgment, reassignment, or an ongoing case.

Svendsen’s September 16 pretrial statement offered a remote bench trial on liability if his proposed damages stipulation was accepted and withdrew any earlier jury demand to the extent permitted. He said he could not travel to the scheduled in-person trial. The September 18 dismissal order ended the opportunity for any trial on the surviving claim, not an ongoing demand for a jury trial.

Representation and case status

Craig and Marie Stevenson were represented at the 2023 summary-judgment hearing; Svendsen is self-represented.

The June 16, 2023 summary judgment in Stevenson was affirmed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals on April 8, 2024; the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review on July 23, 2024. In Svendsen, the September 24 amended order dismissed the claims with prejudice and directed entry of judgment. The docket records judgment entry and notice. (MCRO Indexes 297–299.)

On October 13, 2026, Svendsen filed a Statement of the Case identifying proposed appellate issues. On October 14, Miller granted an appellate fee waiver, finding the proposed appeal “not frivolous” for fee-waiver purposes, and authorized preparation of the October 16, 2025 hearing transcript. The October 15 district-court docket does not list a notice of appeal. A Statement of the Case does not itself commence an appeal. (MCRO Indexes 310–311; October 15 docket.)

The pattern in the written reasons

Both cases ended without trial after rulings that narrowed claims and restricted discovery. In Svendsen, the written reasons also left two concrete questions unanswered: how the acknowledged expense documentation affected the damages ruling, and why the request to revise an interlocutory order was rejected by reference to a rule governing final orders.

The linked records allow readers to judge the consistency and completeness of the court’s reasoning.

Official hearing transcripts

All four transcripts below were filed October 7, 2026, in Court File No. 56-CV-24-1426. Citations above use the transcript page and line numbers.

1. December 9, 2024 hearing transcript — MCRO Index 304, filed October 7, 2026.
2. November 21, 2025 hearing transcript — MCRO Index 305, filed October 7, 2026.
3. May 22, 2026 hearing transcript — MCRO Index 306, filed October 7, 2026.
4. June 22, 2026 hearing transcript — MCRO Index 307, filed October 7, 2026.

Related Justice-Denied coverage

• Motion to Compel Discovery: the documented three-case discovery comparison
• An Order That Answers a Different Motion
• The Summary Judgment Myth
• Judge Kevin M. Miller: Public Record & Order Analyses