Before a Jury Hears the Facts: Three Cases at a Procedural Crossroads

Introduction

When this article was published on September 2, 2026, three civil cases before Judge Kevin M. Miller presented three different tests of the same public question: will genuinely disputed facts reach a jury, or will pleading decisions, discovery limits, evidentiary rulings, and summary judgment determine the result first?

The issue here is not which party should win. It is who decides disputed facts. In Stevenson, Judge Miller restricted discovery, limited requests for admission, denied three motions to compel, and then dismissed the remaining claims at summary judgment. Svendsen has already followed a similar course of early claim reduction, discovery restriction, and dispositive motion practice. That record is substantial enough to justify scrutiny before the next cases are decided.

The cases are Svendsen v. Fergus Falls HRA, Court File No. 56-CV-24-1426; Precision Locating, LLC and Arvig Enterprises, Inc. v. Starkebaum, Court File No. 56-CV-25-198; and Wynn v. Moment in Time Dance Company, LLC, Court File No. 80-CV-26-78. Their different facts and legal theories made them useful prospective tests of whether Judge Miller applies the same procedural principles consistently when the route to a jury is at stake. Wynn has now concluded through settlement rather than a ruling on the pending motion.

How a civil case disappears before trial

A jury demand is not a promise that a jury will hear the case. A civil action ordinarily passes through several gates:

1. PleadingsDo the allegations state a legally recognized claim?
2. DiscoveryMay each side obtain the evidence needed to test the competing accounts?
3. Dispositive motionsDoes any genuine dispute of material fact remain?
4. Jury trialWhich witnesses are credible, and what actually happened?

Each gate serves a legitimate purpose. Courts should dismiss claims that fail as a matter of law, limit discovery that is irrelevant or disproportionate, and grant summary judgment where no genuine dispute of material fact exists. But those tools become outcome-determinative when a legal characterization replaces a disputed fact, discovery is curtailed before the necessary record can be developed, or credibility is resolved from competing papers rather than testimony.

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01 requires both the absence of a genuine dispute over a material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. It also requires the court to state its reasons for granting or denying the motion. Rule 26 makes proportionality central to discovery, but its factors include more than cost: the importance of the issues, the parties’ relative access to information, and the importance of the discovery to resolving the case also matter.

The three-case watch

Svendsen: the most advanced narrowing

Steve Svendsen began with claims against the Fergus Falls Housing and Redevelopment Authority, the City, and public officials. Judge Miller’s March 6, 2025 order on the motions to dismiss dismissed most of the claims and parties, leaving a limited contract theory against the HRA. The order treated $3,500 as the maximum available recovery. That figure then became part of the rationale for restricting later discovery.

The court’s February 17, 2026 order records another consequential step in that narrowing. Judge Miller denied Svendsen’s motions for sanctions and for in-camera review of withheld or redacted discovery. The court found insufficient proof that the HRA destroyed evidence and no prima facie basis for applying the crime-fraud exception, so it did not inspect the disputed documents. It also ordered Svendsen to pay the HRA $999 in reasonable expenses after finding that he had not certified a good-faith effort to confer before filing the motions. The order is therefore the primary source for both the restricted discovery record and the expense award addressed in later proceedings.

Justice-Denied has separately documented Judge Miller’s August 19, 2026 order and memorandum in An Order That Answers a Different Motion. Among other problems, the order analyzed a stay request as reconsideration, referred to requests for admission as interrogatories, and quoted one sentence from Svendsen’s filing without the next sentence that explained it. It also contained a catch-all denial even though the separately argued June summary-judgment motions were not identified or analyzed.

The September 2 docket contained no summary-judgment order. It nevertheless still lists a September 30 pretrial and a four-day jury trial beginning October 12. Those settings matter, but the unresolved cross-motions could still determine whether the jury hears the surviving claim. The pending cross-motions are documented in Svendsen’s memorandum supporting partial summary judgment and the HRA’s memorandum supporting summary judgment. The docket’s most recent entry was an August 28 correspondence filing requesting judicial approval, leaving the June cross-motions unresolved on the public docket. That makes the next order a particularly important test. The question is not merely who wins. It is whether the written decision accurately identifies each motion, separates undisputed facts from competing evidence, applies the correct perspective to each cross-motion, and states what—if anything—remains for a jury.

Starkebaum: an important counterexample, with a warning attached

Precision Locating v. Starkebaum supplies a direct benchmark for the other cases. The dispute includes contract, duty-of-loyalty, and defamation claims arising from an anonymous Facebook post. The plaintiffs allege Starkebaum caused another person to publish it; Starkebaum disputes responsibility.

The factual conflict is concrete. In a February 11 affidavit, Christopher Mayen swore that he alone drafted, published, and removed the Facebook post and that Starkebaum had nothing to do with it. At his March 13 deposition, however, Mayen testified that important information in the post came from Starkebaum and described conversations in which Starkebaum reacted to the post and warned that it could place him in breach of his settlement agreement. Those materially different sworn accounts present precisely the kind of credibility question Judge Miller later said belongs to the factfinder.

In the October 2, 2025 motion-hearing transcript, Judge Miller expressly recognized the role of the factfinder. Referring to competing accounts and circumstantial evidence, he observed that trials often involve “someone saying one thing and someone saying something else” and stated that factual issues are “in charge of” the factfinders, not the judge. The later orders preserved a jury path: the court did not reopen an expired dispositive-motion deadline, and the July 14 scheduling order set a four-day jury trial beginning December 7, 2026. Both sides filed proposed jury instructions on August 6, the plaintiffs filed a proposed verdict, and the pretrial hearing was held August 18.

That additional fact development was court-ordered, not merely something the parties pursued on their own. In an October 17 order, Judge Miller found that Starkebaum had intentionally frustrated deposition questioning and permitted up to seven additional hours of examination. He later refused to quash the deposition of Starkebaum’s minor daughter because Starkebaum continued to assert truth and substantial truth as defenses, while limiting the deposition to two hours and relevant subjects. These rulings allowed targeted discovery to develop evidence bearing on disputed facts before trial.

Another potentially case-expanding motion remains unresolved. On August 6, the plaintiffs filed an amended memorandum seeking permission to add punitive damages. They argue that evidence developed through the reopened deposition, the deposition of Starkebaum’s minor daughter, and later witness declarations establishes deliberate disregard for their rights. Those assertions remain contested, and the court has not granted permission to add the punitive-damages claim. The April 6, 2026 hearing transcript excerpts, filed October 27, directly document Miller’s direction to assemble newly received information in an updated motion packet before decision. He explained the value of a coherent record for the court and any later appellate review. Index 230, 9:14–25, 32:15–33:5, 65:10–16, 69:15–70:11. Adding punitive damages requires the separate screening under Minnesota Statutes section 549.191. The October 27 order leaves remaining motions for another pretrial if mediation fails.

Judge Miller therefore stated the correct principle in unmistakable terms: disputed facts belong to the factfinder. That makes materially different treatment elsewhere more consequential, not less. In the same case, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ attorney expert, barred Starkebaum from relying on qualified privilege and protected-speech defenses, reserved several consequential evidentiary questions, and warned that the damages record must justify convening a jury. The question is whether the court’s own October formulation remains the governing rule when damages, causation, and admissibility are resolved—and when comparable disputes arise in Svendsen and Wynn.

Wynn: settled before the summary-judgment hearing

Macy Wynn’s summons and complaint alleges that, at age seventeen, she was dropped on her head and neck while performing a group dance maneuver under adult instruction. Her complaint alleges inadequate instruction, supervision, safety precautions, and emergency response. The defense disputes negligence, invokes assumption of risk, and challenges the nature and extent of damages.

The defense’s August 13 summary-judgment memorandum argues that Wynn repeatedly practiced the maneuver, understood that it might go wrong, and therefore primarily assumed the risk. It also relies on deposition answers indicating no scheduled future treatment or then-current symptoms. Wynn’s August 28 opposition memorandum argues that primary assumption of risk is a narrow no-duty doctrine that should not be extended to an instructor-led rehearsal involving minors. She also identifies contrary evidence of continuing pain and migraines and notes that the April 1 scheduling order sets plaintiff expert disclosures for September 30 and defense disclosures for November 30.

As of September 2, the September 11 hearing remained the next public checkpoint. The September 10 settlement filing ended that prospective test before the motion was heard. The motion had presented two distinct questions. First, was the risk properly defined broadly as “a dance maneuver might fail,” or more specifically as a risk allegedly increased by inadequate instruction, coordination, or safety practices? Second, could future damages be removed before the expert and medical record contemplated by the scheduling order was complete?

The motion asked the court to decide those issues before the scheduled expert record was complete. Had the motion been decided, competing accounts about the instruction given, the dancers’ readiness, the safety measures used, or the injury’s continuing effects would have required the court to determine whether genuine disputes of material fact remained. Choosing one account from competing testimony would have decided the jury’s work on paper.

The historical baseline: how often has a civil jury actually decided?

Justice-Denied’s review of MCRO hearing entries located 43 distinct Otter Tail County civil cases assigned to Judge Miller with at least one setting labeled “Jury Trial” from his May 2018 appointment through August 31, 2026. The entries do not reveal every reason a case ended, but they do reveal the central fact: only one of those settings was marked as a jury trial held before Judge Miller.

One case—Becker & Drewes v. Schenatzki & Dairyland Insurance, Court File No. 56-CV-18-764—was marked as a jury trial held before Judge Miller in April 2019. But Judge Waldemar Senyk originally received the case, it was reassigned to Miller after his appointment, liability was conceded, and the jury decided damages. Thus, among the cases reviewed, no identified civil case involving contested liability has reached a jury verdict before Judge Miller.

Twenty-five of the 43 cases had jury settings marked “Cancelled; Settled.” Ten others marked “Cancelled; Dismissed” had stipulations associated with the disposition, rather than ten merits dismissals imposed by the court. Schumacher-Cookman v. Schumacher, Court File No. 56-CV-18-1954, also shows that Judge Miller can allow disputed claims to survive summary judgment: the parties later waived a jury, and he conducted a bench trial in June 2023.

The plaintiffs nevertheless recovered nothing at the ensuing bench trial. Judge Miller denied all three surviving claims and also held them time-barred, while denying the defendant’s counterclaim. That outcome is important because it separates result from process: allowing disputed claims to survive summary judgment did not guarantee the plaintiffs a victory. It allowed credibility and disputed facts to be decided after testimony and evidence, at the stage when factfinding was proper.

Settlements and stipulated dispositions explain many of the cancellations. They do not erase the striking result: across the civil cases reviewed, no identified case involving contested liability has reached a jury verdict before Judge Miller. Against that history, decisions limiting what may be discovered, pleaded, or presented carry exceptional weight. The practical loss of jury adjudication is not theoretical; it is the recurring outcome.

Six questions that should govern the next rulings

The benchmark is now on the record

Judge Miller’s own statement in Starkebaum supplies the benchmark: conflicting accounts and circumstantial evidence present factual issues for the factfinder, not the judge. The three cases were selected to show whether that principle would govern consistently. Wynn will not answer that question because the parties settled before the court ruled or a jury heard the facts. The judicial decisions and trial outcomes in Svendsen and Starkebaum can be measured against the same benchmark.

Sending genuine factual disputes to a jury is not special treatment for a litigant. It is consistent application of the rule Judge Miller has already articulated. The Wynn settlement is not such a ruling and provides no basis to infer how the court would have ruled. Justice-Denied will preserve this forecast and record the outcomes through dated updates so readers can compare the principle with the practice.

Why prospective scrutiny matters

This concern rests on an accumulated record, not simple dissatisfaction with an adverse result. In Stevenson, procedural restrictions culminated in dismissal without trial. In Svendsen, early dismissal, a damages cap, and discovery limits have already confined what remains before the pending dispositive ruling.

The contrast with Starkebaum is concrete. There, Judge Miller recognized that cases involving “someone saying one thing and someone saying something else,” together with circumstantial evidence, present factual questions for the factfinder. In Stevenson, however, his summary-judgment order acknowledged that Craig denied any intent to permanently deprive Renee C. Stevenson (Rosemount, MN) of her property and recognized that their marriage was legally significant to whether the alleged conduct constituted theft. The order nevertheless twice “set aside” the marriage fact, identified circumstances supporting the opposite inference about intent, called that adverse theory “more than arguable,” and used it to support dismissal. Instead of leaving the competing inferences to a factfinder, the court resolved every remaining claim without a trial.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but it did not address the district court’s repeated “setting aside” language or its express use of the competing inference about intent. The substantive claims in Stevenson and Starkebaum differ, but Rule 56’s division of responsibility does not: judges determine whether a genuine factual dispute exists; factfinders ordinarily decide which supported account is true.

The risk to the public is not simply that a litigant loses. It is that one case describes conflicting accounts as the ordinary work of a factfinder while another resolves comparable factual conflicts on paper—without a principled explanation for the different method. The judicial decisions in Svendsen and Starkebaum can be compared against that benchmark. Wynn supplies a different kind of outcome: the parties resolved the case before the court decided the motion, so it cannot show which judicial approach would have governed.

Source records reviewed

Related Justice-Denied coverage

• Judge Kevin M. Miller: Public Record & Order Analyses
• Stevenson and Svendsen: discovery limits and summary judgment
• The Summary Judgment Myth
• Motion to Compel Discovery: the documented three-case comparison
• An Order That Answers a Different Motion
• Judge Miller’s Selective Enforcement